| Author | 春名 章二| |
|---|---|
| Published Date | 2004 |
| Publication Title | 北東アジア経済研究 |
| Volume | volume1 |
| Issue | issue1 |
| Content Type | Departmental Bulletin Paper |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/9052 |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
|---|---|
| Published Date | 2005 |
| Publication Title | 北東アジア経済研究 |
| Volume | volume2 |
| Issue | issue1 |
| Content Type | Departmental Bulletin Paper |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/9061 |
| Author | 春名 章二| |
|---|---|
| Published Date | 2005 |
| Publication Title | 北東アジア経済研究 |
| Volume | volume2 |
| Issue | issue1 |
| Content Type | Departmental Bulletin Paper |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/9062 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/9610 |
|---|---|
| FullText URL | 3_0055_0070.pdf |
| Author | 春名 章二| |
| Abstract | 本論文は企業の研究開発（R＆D）行動とこれが産出量等に与える影響を利潤最大化企業と労働者管理企業からなる混合寡占の２段階ゲームモデルを用いて分析したものである。この分析では新たに企業の推測的変動が導入されている。この分析によって両段階とも労働者管理企業にとって寡占の特徴である相互依存関係が消滅することが明らかにされた。さらに、各種パラメータに関する比較静学分析からR＆Dスピルオーバー比率の上昇は利潤最大化企業と異なり、労働者管理企業のR＆D投資を減少させることが示される。加えて、固定費がR＆D投資決定に影響を与え、これが労働者管理企業のR＆D投資水準に影響を与えることが示される。 |
| Keywords | 研究開発投資 混合寡占 R＆Dスピルオーバー 労働者管理企業 推測敵変動 |
| Publication Title | 北東アジア経済研究 |
| Published Date | 2006 |
| Volume | volume3 |
| Issue | issue1 |
| Start Page | 55 |
| End Page | 70 |
| ISSN | 1880-8476 |
| language | Japanese |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 120002311178 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/12404 |
|---|---|
| FullText URL | 38_4_001_019.pdf |
| Author | Azizi Mohammad Najeeb| Haruna, Shoji| |
| Abstract | It is significant to thoroughly scrutinize past practices and feats, to identify important factors towards developmental failure and success and to avoid mistakes for the future of an industrialized and prosperous Afghanistan. As a result of profound research, a number of researchers have added to the literature on the country’s history, culture, wars, strategic importance and position as a buffer state that cover Afghan polity, ideological dimensions, and social and cultural intricacies. However, few scholarly works exist on the political economy in general and on the historical economic performances and policies in detail. Drawing upon immense and varied literature, the purpose of this paper is to analyze and describe historical and social changes, economic structures and strategies of Afghanistan with a detailed account of (i) political vision, (ii) institutional reforms, (iii) economic agendas, and (iv) development progress in the light of economic development theory and practice. We conclude that being provided right policies and firm political determination, Afghanistan has the potential to become a more developed country in the short span of time. |
| Keywords | Economic History Development Economics Afghan Economy |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 2007-03 |
| Volume | volume38 |
| Issue | issue4 |
| Start Page | 1 |
| End Page | 19 |
| ISSN | 03863069 |
| language | English |
| Copyright Holders | 岡山大学経済学会 |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 120002304845 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/40535 |
|---|---|
| FullText URL | oer_036_4_015_027.pdf |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
| Abstract | We investigate R&D behavior of public firms by using oligopoly models with Cournot−type−quantity and Bertrand−type−price competition. Then the following results are obtained. When public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in quantity competition, (i) the public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in a public monopoly market than in that market if they are substitutes, and (ii) the public firm has a less incentive to invest in R&D in the oligopoly market if they are complements. Furthermore, suppose that public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in price competition. (i) If the products are complements, then a public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market; and (ii) if they are substitutes, then the public firm has a less incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market. |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 2005-03-10 |
| Volume | volume36 |
| Issue | issue4 |
| Start Page | 15 |
| End Page | 27 |
| ISSN | 0386-3069 |
| Related Url | http://www.e.okayama-u.ac.jp/gakkai/ |
| language | English |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 120002576156 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/40590 |
|---|---|
| FullText URL | oer_035_4_001_025.pdf |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
| Abstract | This paper considers whether firms have incentives to disclose their R&D information to their rivals in Cournot−quantity setting and Bertrand−price setting models. Furthermore, we compare market performances, e.g. R&D investments, prices and profits, in these models. It is shown that whether they have such incentives depends only on the signs of cross−price effects in demand functions, irrespective of the type of competition, e.g. Cournot or Bertrand competition. When making comparisons of them among four modes, we find that the formation of R&D cartels tends to increase the expenditure of R&D investment and then gains more profits. Alternatively, we point out that quantity−setting firms gain more profits in the presence of R&D cooperation than in the absence of it when products are substitutes in terms of Cournot competition. |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 2004-03-10 |
| Volume | volume35 |
| Issue | issue4 |
| Start Page | 1 |
| End Page | 25 |
| ISSN | 0386-3069 |
| language | English |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 120002647268 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/40600 |
|---|---|
| FullText URL | oer_034_3_001_018.pdf |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 2002-12-10 |
| Volume | volume34 |
| Issue | issue3 |
| Start Page | 1 |
| End Page | 18 |
| ISSN | 0386-3069 |
| language | English |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 110000130148 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/41522 |
|---|---|
| FullText URL | oer_031_4_285_302.pdf |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
| Abstract | This paper shows that the discussion of Lambertini and Rossini (1998) as to the strategic investment levels oflabour-managed firms in a labour-managed (LM) duopoly is misleading. This is due to the fact that there is no duality between the conditions for maximisation and minimisation, and what is worse, an equilibrium needed for comparison is interior when the investment behaviour of the firms is discussed along the conventional method. We reconsider whether they overinvest or underinvest in R&D, employing a more general model with R&D spillovers. It is demonstrated that results obtained in the LM duopoly are similar to those in a conventional duopoly of profit-maximising firms. |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 2000-03-10 |
| Volume | volume31 |
| Issue | issue4 |
| Start Page | 285 |
| End Page | 302 |
| ISSN | 0386-3069 |
| language | English |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 110000130035 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/41549 |
|---|---|
| Title Alternative | Strategic Games and R&D Investment with Spillovers |
| FullText URL | oer_030_3_107_124.pdf |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
| Abstract | The paper considers the problem of whether in a strategic two-stage game duopolistic firms make an overinvestment or underinvestment in R & D when there are their spillovers. We deal with two cases of Cournot quantity and Bertrand price competitions. It is shown that in Cournot (Bertrand) competition each firm has an incentive to use a larger (less) or less (larger) investment than the one required to minimize the costs of investment according as its rival's spillover rate is relatively small or large. |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 1999-03-10 |
| Volume | volume30 |
| Issue | issue3 |
| Start Page | 107 |
| End Page | 124 |
| ISSN | 0386-3069 |
| language | Japanese |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 110000129950 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/41722 |
|---|---|
| Title Alternative | Export Subsidies and International Duopoly with a Labor-Managed and a Profit-Maximizing Firms |
| FullText URL | oer_026_3-4_195_209.pdf |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 1995-03-10 |
| Volume | volume26 |
| Issue | issue3-4 |
| Start Page | 195 |
| End Page | 209 |
| ISSN | 0386-3069 |
| language | Japanese |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 110000129778 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/41785 |
|---|---|
| Title Alternative | Does an Incumbent in a Labour-Managed Industry Hold Excess Capacity to Deter Entry? |
| FullText URL | oer_025_4_223_240.pdf |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 1994-03-10 |
| Volume | volume25 |
| Issue | issue4 |
| Start Page | 223 |
| End Page | 240 |
| ISSN | 0386-3069 |
| language | Japanese |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 110000129733 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/44386 |
|---|---|
| Title Alternative | Quality choice, vertical product differentiation, and labor-managed oligopoly |
| FullText URL | oer_042_4_001_015.pdf |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
| Abstract | Although quality choice of profit-maximizing oligopolistic firms has been widely analyzed, it is rare to find such an analysis of labor-managed oligopolistic firms. This paper considers the relationship between vertical product differentiation and labor-managed firms in either partial or full market coverage by using a two-stage game model. At the second stage they are involved in either Bertrand or Cournot competition. Then some results, which are different from those derived from the conventional firms, are obtained. For example, 1) when labor-managed firms are involved in price competition in an output market, there exists an interior solution only in an extremely limited case; 2) fixed costs affect not only price and output levels but also the level of quality under both price and quantity competition; and 3) it is impossible to analyze under full market coverage, irrespective of whether labor-managed firms are involved in price or quantity competition in an output market. |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 2011-03-18 |
| Volume | volume42 |
| Issue | issue4 |
| Start Page | 1 |
| End Page | 15 |
| ISSN | 0386-3069 |
| language | Japanese |
| Copyright Holders | Copyright © 2011 岡山大学経済学会 |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 120002835624 |
| JaLCDOI | 10.18926/OER/53093 |
|---|---|
| Title Alternative | Mixed Duopoly, Stackelberg Leadership, and R&D Investment |
| FullText URL | oer_046_2_023_041.pdf |
| Author | Haruna, Shoji| |
| Publication Title | 岡山大学経済学会雑誌 |
| Published Date | 2014-12-18 |
| Volume | volume46 |
| Issue | issue2 |
| Start Page | 23 |
| End Page | 41 |
| ISSN | 0386-3069 |
| Related Url | http://www.e.okayama-u.ac.jp/gakkai/ |
| language | Japanese |
| Copyright Holders | Copyright © 2014 岡山大学経済学会 |
| File Version | publisher |
| NAID | 120005540371 |
