ID | 41549 |
JaLCDOI | |
Sort Key | 5
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タイトル(別表記) | Strategic Games and R&D Investment with Spillovers
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フルテキストURL | |
著者 | |
抄録 | The paper considers the problem of whether in a strategic two-stage game duopolistic firms make an overinvestment or underinvestment in R & D when there are their spillovers. We deal with two cases of Cournot quantity and Bertrand price competitions. It is shown that in Cournot (Bertrand) competition each firm has an incentive to use a larger (less) or less (larger) investment than the one required to minimize the costs of investment according as its rival's spillover rate is relatively small or large.
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備考 | 論説 (Article)
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出版物タイトル |
岡山大学経済学会雑誌
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発行日 | 1999-03-10
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巻 | 30巻
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号 | 3号
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出版者 | 岡山大学経済学会
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出版者(別表記) | The Economic Association of Okayama University
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開始ページ | 107
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終了ページ | 124
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ISSN | 0386-3069
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NCID | AN00032897
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資料タイプ |
学術雑誌論文
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OAI-PMH Set |
岡山大学
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言語 |
日本語
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論文のバージョン | publisher
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NAID | |
Eprints Journal Name | oer
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