ID | 40590 |
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Sort Key | 1
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フルテキストURL | |
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抄録 | This paper considers whether firms have incentives to disclose their R&D information to their rivals in Cournot−quantity setting and Bertrand−price setting models. Furthermore, we compare market performances, e.g. R&D investments, prices and profits, in these models. It is shown that whether they have such incentives
depends only on the signs of cross−price effects in demand functions, irrespective of the type of competition, e.g. Cournot or Bertrand competition. When making comparisons of them among four modes, we find that the formation of R&D cartels tends to increase the expenditure of R&D investment and then gains more profits.
Alternatively, we point out that quantity−setting firms gain more profits in the presence of R&D cooperation than in the absence of it when products are substitutes in terms of Cournot competition.
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備考 | 論説 (Article)
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出版物タイトル |
岡山大学経済学会雑誌
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発行日 | 2004-03-10
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巻 | 35巻
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号 | 4号
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出版者 | 岡山大学経済学会
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出版者(別表記) | The Economic Association of Okayama University
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開始ページ | 1
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終了ページ | 25
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ISSN | 0386-3069
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NCID | AN00032897
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資料タイプ |
学術雑誌論文
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OAI-PMH Set |
岡山大学
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言語 |
英語
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論文のバージョン | publisher
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NAID | |
Eprints Journal Name | oer
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