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ID 40527
フルテキストURL
著者
Yokoo, Masanori 岡山大学
抄録
This note considers a situation in which the publisher of an academic journal seeks to maintain the number of contributions to the journal by subsidizing the contributors with some incentive payments. We show that under the incentive payment scheme that distributes some pre−determined total amount of payments equally to each contributor (the constant total payment scheme), the number of contributions can fluctuate cyclically as well as chaotically over time when the potential contributors form adaptive expectations. Numerical simulations suggest, among other things, that the performance of the constant total payment scheme may be more efficient than the constant per−capita payment scheme when the total amount of payments is supposed to be small.
備考
研究ノート (Note)
発行日
2004-09-10
出版物タイトル
岡山大学経済学会雑誌
出版物タイトル(別表記)
Okayama Economic Review
36巻
2号
出版者
岡山大学経済学会
出版者(別表記)
The Economic Association of Okayama University
開始ページ
35
終了ページ
48
ISSN
0386-3069
NCID
AN00032897
資料タイプ
学術雑誌論文
関連URL
http://www.e.okayama-u.ac.jp/gakkai/
言語
English
論文のバージョン
publisher
査読
有り
Eprints Journal Name
oer