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ID 40487
フルテキストURL
著者
Yokoo, Masanori 岡山大学
抄録
This paper considers a dynamic commons game in relation with mitigation of invasive alien species such as nutria in Okayama. In our commons game, players (trappers) non−cooperatively seek to maximize their own payoff by extracting the renewable resource stock (nutria). One key assumption is that the cost of extraction of the resource is negatively related to the current stock level. For a low level of resource stock, the extraction cost is high, which makes the extraction less lucrative for the players and which in turn stimulates the renewable resource stock to regenerate more rapidly. As the resource stock reaches a high level, the reverse process will start, and this can cause oscillating behaviors. Our simple model proposed here exemplifies that an increase in the number of players can drastically change the qualitative as well as quantitative features of the dynamics for the renewable resource stock.
備考
研究ノート (Note)
発行日
2005-06-10
出版物タイトル
岡山大学経済学会雑誌
出版物タイトル(別表記)
Okayama Economic Review
37巻
1号
出版者
岡山大学経済学会
出版者(別表記)
The Economic Association of Okayama University
開始ページ
53
終了ページ
61
ISSN
0386-3069
NCID
AN00032897
資料タイプ
学術雑誌論文
関連URL
http://www.e.okayama-u.ac.jp/gakkai/
言語
English
論文のバージョン
publisher
査読
有り
Eprints Journal Name
oer