JaLCDOI 10.18926/OER/54163
タイトル(別表記) A Survey of the Experimental Studies on Leniency Programs
フルテキストURL oer_047_3_123_139.pdf
著者 濱口 泰代|
抄録(別表記) The purpose of this article is to survey recent experimental studies on leniency programs, which have been introduced in competition policies around the world. Some theoretical studies show that leniency programs are effective to dissolve cartels, but they are not strong enough to deter new cartels from being formed. Although one empirical study confirms that leniency programs are effective to dissolve cartels, it is hard to judge from field data whether leniency programs deter cartels and how they influence market prices. To solve these issues, experimental economics studies on leniency programs have been conducted. Most of them also discovered that leniency programs are effective to dissolve cartels. However, it is still necessary to continue to carry out experimental studies to examine the effects on the stability of cartels and market prices, in terms of institutional parameters, such as the investigation frequency, timing of whistle blowing, and the number of firms which can receive leniency.
キーワード leniency antitrust policy oligopoly cartel
出版物タイトル 岡山大学経済学会雑誌
発行日 2016-03-19
47巻
3号
開始ページ 123
終了ページ 139
ISSN 0386-3069
言語 Japanese
著作権者 Copyright © 2016 岡山大学経済学会
論文のバージョン publisher
NAID 120005740501