

**STATE-MAKING AND LOCAL RESPONSE  
IN NORTH CENTRAL VIETNAM**

中部ベトナム山岳地域における国家機構形成と地域の対応

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## ABSTRACT

Currently, large areas of land and natural resources in North Central Vietnam's upland, accessed and managed by ethnic minority people, have been appropriated to serve for the government's development schemes. These types of the state-making have largely excluded local people's rights of accessing and using natural resources, shaping different geographies of each area and livelihoods of ethnic minority people. In turn, the different local contexts in geographical setting have different impacts and lead to different local responses. Therefore, the dissertation aims to explore the process of state-making that has affected the socio-politico situations and livelihoods of ethnic minority people. Furthermore, the author examines the local response to mitigate the state-making through three case studies: Bo Hon village in Thua Thien Hue Province, Suoi Ton hamlet and Un hamlet in Thanh Hoa Province, North Central Vietnam upland.

The first case study was conducted in Bo Hon village, consisted of Katu ethnic minority, to explore the impact of Binh Dien hydropower dam construction on local governance and livelihood change. The results show that the construction of Binh Dien hydropower dam has not paid sufficient attention to the customary local system or entitlement to forestland and other common resources that significantly affect local governance and livelihoods. Meanwhile, in the resettlement area, the new local governance system, introduced by the local government, is replacing the customary governance. Livelihoods in the relocation village have been changed as well. Landholdings in the village are too small to generate enough income to sustain households. Thus, livelihood has changed from heavy dependence on natural forests to intensive agriculture. Yet, the monthly household incomes have significantly declined, increasing poverty in the village.

The second case study focuses on Hmong responses to mitigate the state interventions for establishing the nature reserve in Suoi Ton hamlet. The state's approval of the legitimate and statutory law for the nature reserve largely excluded local rights of access to and the use of natural resources. Based on Scott's contribution of Moral Economy (1976), the author argues that local responses function as a 'risk-averter' against state intervention. Meanwhile, the intra and inter-ethnic relationships based on the 'subsistence ethic' help locals successfully mitigate state intervention. Furthermore, the main findings, which reveal that not only the intra-ethnic relationship but also the inter-ethnic relationship among ethnic minorities can play an important role in maintaining the Moral Economy, are expected to deepen the previous understanding on the Moral Economy, which has previously constrained its scope to the intra-ethnic relationship.

The third case study derives how Hmong people of Un hamlet practice everyday forms of resistance to avoid the state surveillance. The result shows that the state implemented the forest land allocation, sedentarization program as a great effort to exercise controlling people and

resources under the state's surveillance. In turn, the Hmong refuse the use of land allocated by the state, expand the encroachment of shifting cultivation outside the village territory and tacit cultivation traditional medicine of Hmong people. By using settlement pattern to create friction of distance from the state power, Hmong people successfully repelled the state surveillance.

In sum up, this study implies that the current problems of ethnic people in the upland areas of North Central Vietnam are closely linked to increasing involvement in the state-making, which has tried to exclude the right of accessing to natural resources and integrates them into the state's control. These state-making considerably changed the traditional governance system and livelihoods of ethnic people. Meanwhile, the local contexts consist of geographical settings, inter and intra-ethnic relations play an importance role in mitigating the state intervention. These findings help the state reconsidering the state-making that have been constructed with very little respect for differences and desires of ethnic people.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

Avg: Average

GSOV: General Statistics Office of Vietnam

HH: household

Ha: hectares

FPD: Forest Protection Department

FLA: Forest Land Allocation

MARD: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

NTFPs: Non-timber forest products

USD: United States dollar (currency)

VND: Vietnamese dong (currency)

WB: World Bank

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background

Vietnam's upland is inhabited by more than 14 million people from ethnic minorities (Rambo and Jamieson, 2003). People living in the uplands used land under a variety of customary property arrangements tied to customary politico-legal institutions well into the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Sikor, 2011a). Uplanders hold own customary systems of land tenure, governance systems and traditional practices of farming, *i.e.* swidden cultivation. Customary law is the legal constitution of a village, including civil and criminal codes, and other articles on preserving the ethics, customs, and habits related to social organization as well as to the life of the village. Local regulations enshrine customary village laws that attempt to set some restrictions on the withdrawal of resources from common lands (McElwee, 2011). Moreover, forests play a vital role in maintaining the customary laws, traditional governance systems, rituals, culture, and habits of ethnic minorities in Vietnam.

Currently, large areas of land and natural resources in Vietnam's upland, accessed and managed by ethnic minority people, have been appropriated to serve for the government's development schemes. Firstly, because of the national demand for electricity, there has been a considerable increase in land acquisitions from ethnic communities to build hydropower dams. Over the past 20 years, the Vietnamese government has extensively operated 1,967 dams (Dao, 2010). Such hydropower dam construction has dispossessed 620,000 hectares of forest and agricultural land, displacing more than 193,780 people (85% of whom are ethnic minorities) and moving them to resettlement sites (Pham, 2014; Bui and Schreinemachers, 2011). This dispossession of land, where ethnic minorities have lived for a long time with various cultures and beliefs, has noticeably affected the social organization, economic activities, and cultural identity of these groups. In the new resettlement areas, these groups are unable to maintain their traditional livelihoods or observe their cultural practices.

Secondly, large areas of land and natural resources, accessed and managed by forest-dependent peoples, have been confiscated for global and national interests for biodiversity conservation in Vietnam since 1990 (Zingerli, 2005). The Vietnamese government set up many Protected Areas which consist of the National Park, and a Nature Reserve for protection and environmental and biodiversity conservation. Currently, there are 164 Protected Areas established under sponsorship from both the Vietnamese government and international organizations (Do, Krott and Böcher, 2017). Meanwhile, the land used for the protected areas sharply expanded from 880,000 hectares in 1986 to 2.4 million hectares in 2006 (Dressler, To and Mahanty, 2013). This

type of conservation, without human disturbance, largely excluded local rights of access to and the use of natural resources. Consequently, forest-dependent peoples lose local commons used for their traditional livelihood activities (Hoang, 2011; McElwee, 2010). The process of the Vietnamese government's nationalising of common village lands can be seen in forest land allocation (Sikor, 2011b). Former communal lands were privatised, and land rights were changed based on a market-oriented land tenure system (McElwee, 2011). Furthermore, the local community has experienced the gradual loss of local commons and have had their subsistence needs threatened (McElwee, 2011).

These types of the state-making have largely excluded local people's rights of accessing and using natural resources, shaping different geographies of each area and livelihoods of ethnic minority people. In turn, the different local contexts in geographical setting have different impacts and lead to different local responses. Therefore, the dissertation aims to explore the process of state-making that has affected the socio-politico situations and livelihoods of ethnic minority people. Furthermore, the author examines the local response to mitigate the state-making by using three case studies: Bo Hon village in Thua Thien Hue Province, Suoi Ton hamlet and Un hamlet in Thanh Hoa Province, North Central Vietnam upland. The specific purposes are:


- Figure out the implementation of state-making process
- Identify the impact of state-making on the local governance and livelihoods of ethnic minorities
- Explore the local responses used by the ethnic minorities for everyday resistance, inter and intra ethnic relations to mitigate/beyond state-making

### 1.2. Justification of research site selection

The three case studies were deliberately chosen to represent typical state-making and different geographical settings (Table 1)

**Table 1. Basic information on research sites**

<b>Research sites</b>	<b>Bo Hon</b>	<b>Suoi Ton</b>	<b>Un</b>
Geographical settings	Close to city center, under state power	Far away from city center, under state power	More far away from city center, outside state power
Ethnic group	Katu	Hmong	Hmong
State-making	Hydropower Dam Construction	Nature Reserve	Sedentarization



**Figure 1. Location of research sites**

### 1.3. Dissertation structure

The structure of dissertation is organized as follows seven chapter. First chapter gives contextual on effects of state-making process on socio-political and livelihoods of ethnic minority people in Vietnam uplands. Three main state-making fully focused Hydropower Dam Construction, establishment Nature Reserve and Sedentarization Program. Furthermore, this chapter also examines research objectives and methodology.

The second chapter develops the conceptualization of the Moral Economy (Scott, 1976) and everyday resistance (Scott, 1985)

The third chapter gives a brief overview the regional context of state-making in North Central Vietnam. This section allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how hydropower dam construction, nature reserve and sedentarization implemented and impacted on local people in regional of research sites.

The fourth chapter focused on case study of a Katu community in Central Vietnam that was displaced and resettled by the Binh Dien hydropower dam. The results show that the construction of Binh Dien Hydropower dam has not paid sufficient attention to the customary local system or entitlement to forestland and other common resources that significantly affect local governance and livelihoods. Meanwhile, in the resettlement area, the new local governance system, introduced

by the local government, is replacing the customary governance. Livelihoods in the relocation village have been changed as well. Landholdings in the village are too small to generate enough income to sustain households. Thus, livelihood has changed from heavy dependence on natural forests to intensive agriculture. Yet, the monthly income of households have significantly declined, increasing poverty in the village.

The fifth chapter explores how Hmong responses to mitigate the state interventions for establishing the nature reserve in Suoi Ton hamlet. The state's approval of the legitimate and statutory law for the nature reserve largely excluded local rights of access to and the use of natural resources. Based on Scott's contribution of Moral Economy (Scott, 1976), the author argues that local responses function as a 'risk-averter' against state intervention. Meanwhile, the intra and inter-ethnic relationships based on the 'subsistence ethic' help locals successfully mitigate state intervention. Furthermore, the main findings, which reveal that not only the intra-ethnic relationship but also the inter-ethnic relationship among ethnic minorities can play an important role in maintaining the Moral Economy, are expected to deepen the previous understanding on the Moral Economy, which has previously constrained its scope to the intra-ethnic relationship.

The next section address Hmong people of Un hamlet practice everyday forms of resistance to avoid the state surveillance. The result shows that the state implemented the forest land allocation, sedentarization program as a great effort to exercise controlling people and resources under the state's surveillance. In turn, the Hmong refuse the use of land allocated by the state, expand the encroachment of shifting cultivation outside the village territory and tacit cultivation traditional medicine of Hmong people. By using settlement pattern to create friction of distance from the state power, Hmong people successfully repelled the state surveillance.

The issues regarding state-making process and local response are discussed in final chapter.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

#### **2.1. The concept of Moral Economy**

In the theory of Moral Economy (Scott, 1976), Scott argues that farmers are always troubled about not being starved. With the attitude of "safety is the first priority," they always think of a life that may have a low standard but be safe rather than a high income but risky one. This means that Scott views farmers as agricultural producers who disgust the risks of life. He believes that poor farmers always have risks of falling into poverty. Under such conditions, only a miniature risk or incident such as diseases, crop failure can make threats to the lives of their families. Therefore, they always struggle to keep away from risks in production. They are not interested in the market economy, do not like buying and selling because both are often risky even though being aware that those can bring about more profit. Farmers dislike planting industrial crops, hesitate in investing and innovating their traditional farming practices. However, Scott argues that the colonial state's intervention in the community, along with the commercialization and modernization of agricultural production, has led to the adoption of modern agricultural machines, the rotation of crops, etc., which break the social structure and traditional practices that used to nurture characteristics of the "moral economy" in the peasant society; consequently, which have led to the resistance of farmers.

#### **2.2. The concept of everyday resistance**

In his most significant works, Scott (1990, 1985) discusses a number of theories related to power, domination and resistance. He brings about a broad context for examining the process in which groups having less well-off socio-economic and cultural power refuse to give in to the dominance in labour exploitation. In his study, he emphasizes on pointing out the erroneous polarization between resistance and survival, and concentrates on the activities, relationships, and interactive dimensions of contentious political issues and conflicts correlated to the exploitation of farmers' labour. Although later, there are other researchers who have carried out other field surveys and paid attention to other research issues, many still use his terminology and theoretical points due to not only the fact that the nuance of ethnology is unambiguous in his arguments that the resistance of vulnerable social groups is worthy being considered and how the "weapons" that they use generate the power to reposition the dominant power but also the universality and high applicability of the terms "weapon of the weak" or "art of resistance".

In agreement with Scott's point of view, Kerkvliet (2005) analyses the everyday politics of farmers in and after agricultural collectivization in Vietnam. According to Kerkvliet (2005), the

distinctive characteristics of everyday politics is the coexistence of both cooperation and conflict, even conflict between different social classes in the process of using, producing and distributing resources. Oppositeness in everyday politics presents in controversial and contradictory values. Developing social theories is a complex of values and Kerkvliet argues that dependent groups and dominant ones in the area of the author's study hold different standards and viewpoints on the utility, production and allocation of resources. Whereas the dominant ones declare that they have the power and authority over possessions and market value, the fragile group believes that first, "people who have more should lend a hand to the less" and the second "the basic human requirements should be fulfilled". In other words, dependents often require fundamental rights: the right to live safely even in a modest standard and the right of being treated as a human being. The controversial values then lead to the second aspect of the contradiction in everyday politics: resistance.

Resistances for requesting or against being requested often take place in the form of everyday resistances. These are tacit, unorganized protesting actions of individuals. Daily resistance is considered as a weapon of the weak, a normal but uninterrupted struggle of the peasantry against those who aim to exploit labour, food, taxes or charges and profits of farmers. Most of daily protest actions are not publicized, organized, or collective. These forms of social class struggle have some characteristics in common: they are individual actions and for individual benefits, with little or no coordination, avoiding direct confrontation with the authorities or with the norms of the elite.

Everyday resistance will make a great difference (Kerkvliet, 2005). In the case of decollectization in Vietnam, Kerkvliet makes it visible that these small actions have created barriers, which are formed by long-standing indecency, ignorance, tacit protest; non organization of farmers in many villages, has brought Viet Nam's agricultural collectivization policy to a stop and has to change (Kerkvliet, 2005).

## CHAPTER 3

### BACKGROUND OF STATE-MAKING IN NORTH CENTRAL VIETNAM

#### 3.1. General information about North Central Vietnam

This region is one of seven socio - economic regions of Vietnam. The Northern Central Coast Region of Vietnam consists of six provinces, namely Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri and Thua Thien Hue. This area stretches from the south of Tam Diep Mountain Range to the north of Hai Van Pass with the natural boundary of Bach Ma mountain range. It borders the Northern and Red River delta to the North, the South Central Coast to the South, the Truong Son Range Mountain and Laos to the West, and the East Sea to the East. The total area of region covers approximately 5,152.5 thousand ha, or 15.6 percent of the national territory of Vietnam (GSOV, 2010). The area is a long, narrow corridor with a complex terrain including narrow plains, midland, mountains, coasts, islands throughout the territory, in which hilly land and mountains account three quarters of the total area. North Central region has mountains to the west. It is bordered by Laos to medium and low altitudes. In the western mountainous area of Thanh Hoa province, it has the height of 1,000 – 1,500m. The mountainous area of Nghe An - Ha Tinh is the upstream of the Truong Son Range, which has highly sloping terrain, most of the highest mountains are scattered here. The delta region has a total area of 6,200 square kilometers, of which the Thanh Hoa Delta is covered by sediment of the Ma River and the Chu River, which accounts for nearly half the plain area of the region and is the largest delta of the North Central Vietnam.

**Table 2. The characteristics of North Central Vietnam**

<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Thanh Hoa</b>	<b>Nghe An</b>	<b>Ha Tinh</b>	<b>Quang Binh</b>	<b>Quang Tri</b>	<b>Thua Thien Hue</b>
Area (thousand ha)	5,152.5	1,113.3	1,649.1	602.6	806.5	474.7	506.3
Population (thousand people)	10,070.3	3,400.6	2912	1227	844.9	598.3	1,087.5
Ethnic minorities (thousand people)	1,160.7	599.3	422.1	2.2	20.4	69.3	47.4
- Hmong	43.8	14.8	29	0.004	0.006	0.003	0.025
- Katu	14.6	0.024	0.019	0	0.001	0.015	14.6

(Source: GSOV, 2010)

The population of the Northern Central region is about 10070.3 thousand people, accounting for 11.7 percent of Vietnam's population, of which about 1,160.7 thousand people (11.5%) are ethnic minority people (GSOV, 2010). According to the General Statistic Office Vietnam (GSOV)

(2010), this region is the home of 25 different ethnic minority groups, including Thai, Muong, Hmong, Ta Oi, Katu, Bru-Van Kieu. There are different dominant ethnic minorities group in difference province. In Thanh Hoa Province, 97 percent ethnic minorities are Thai, Muong and Hmong groups. Meanwhile Thai, Hmong and Tho groups account for 92 percent of the population ethnic minorities in Nghe An Province. In Province of Ha Tinh, the majority of ethnic minorities are Thai, Muong, Tay and Lao groups (81%). The dominant ethnic minorities in Quang Binh and Quang Tri are Bru-Van Kieu, which account for 71% and 79%. And, the Katu and Ta Oi ethnic group are the largest proportion (93%) of ethnic minorities in Thua Thien Hue Province.

### **3.2. Hydropower dam construction**

Apart from the main river systems such as Ma River, Ca River, Gianh River, Nhat Le River, Thach Han River and Huong River, the Northern Central Region also has numerous watery systems. Rivers and streams in this area are formed in the high and long ranges of Truong Son Range; consequently they are exceedingly slanting. Moreover, the Northern Central Region has the rather high annual average rainfall, at about 1900mm/ year, with the highest recorded number of 3500mm. With the rivers having soaring slope and large hydraulic discharge, it is extremely appropriate to construct and develop hydro power plants.

With the aims to satisfy the electricity demands of not only production and households but also the industrialization in the Northern Central Region, the construction of hydropower plants in both small and medium capacity has taken place relatively speedily in most of local provinces.

According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, by the end of 2013 there had been 100 small and medium hydropower plants that were constructed or planned to do so in the main river systems (MOIT, 2013). Particularly, there are 16 hydropower plants that are being constructed or being investigated to invest in Thanh Hoa province. Among them, three have been finished and currently operated, meanwhile thirteen others are being built (Minh, 2018; Thanh Hoa People's Committee, 2017; Thanh Hoa People's Committee, 2015). In Nghe An, of 33 planned hydropower plants, 12 are being operated and 21 are at the stage of land clearance and relocation of the residents (Nguyen, 2017; Huu, 2016). The number of hydropower plants has increased rapidly; in 2005 there were only three plants, but 10 years later, this number was four folded with 12 plants (Huu, 2016). In Thua Thien Hue province, in total 21 proposal projects there are 11 small and medium hydropower plants have finished or been being built with the total capacity of 357MW (Nguyen & Le, 2011; Mai, 2008). Likewise, in Quang Binh province, 21 small and medium hydropower plants were approved for planning until 2020 (Quang Binh People's Committee, 2009).

Most of the hydropower projects are located in upper reaches of mountainous districts of the North Central Region. In the province of Nghe An, all of large hydropower plants are constructed

in mountainous ones. According to statistics, in three mountainous districts of Ky Son, Tuong Duong and Que Phong, in Nghe An Province, there are 7, 8 and 12 hydropower projects respectively (Huu, 2016). Likewise, A Luoi hydropower project in Thua Thien Hue province, Trung Son hydropower plant in Thanh Hoa province, Huong Son hydropower plant and Ho Ho hydropower plant in Quang Binh province are all situated in the most mountainous and remote areas of A Luoi, Quan Hoa-Muong Lat, Huong Son and Tuyen Hoa districts respectively (Integrated Environments, 2009; Quang Binh People’s Committee, 2009; Mai, 2008).

Furthermore, hydropower projects are constructed in densely populated river basins. For example, it is in only one kilometre of the length by Nam Co River that three hydroelectric power plants are in operation, namely Nam Can, Nam Mo and Ban Canh and one is under investigation of being approved of the investment license (Viet, 2016). Meanwhile, on the branches of the Huong River, there are a number of hydropower plants including Binh Dien, A Luoi, Huong Dien and Thuong Nhat. Similarly, in Bo River, Thua Thien Hue province are 7 hydropower projects. In the province of Quang Binh, there are 15 hydropower projects in the Nhat Le river basin, together with 6 others in that of the Gianh river (Gia, 2009).

**Table 3. The number of hydropower dams in the main basins of the Northern Central Vietnam**

<b>River basin</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>Number of hydropower construction</b>
Ma-Chu	Thanh Hoa	16
Ca	Nghe An, Ha Tinh	45
Gianh- Nhat Le	Quang Binh	21
Thach Han	Quang Tri	8
Huong	Thua Thien Hue	11
<b>Sum</b>		<b>101</b>

(Source: Minh, 2018; Thanh Hoa People’s Committee, 2017; Thanh Hoa People’s Committee, 2015; Gia, 2009; Quang Binh People’s Committee, 2009; Quang Tri People’s Committee, 2008)

In addition to the benefits of ensuring the region's electricity supply, the construction of several hydropower projects has slashed the rivers into small sections, upsetting the natural flow of the rivers. Moreover, it has put pressure on not only forest lands but also the life of people inhabiting in the hydropower construction area. First of all, the construction of hydroelectricity has resulted in the loss of large areas of forest land, including the land of protection forest,

production forest and agricultural land. According to a report of the People's Committee of Nghe An Province, for the construction of Ban Ve Hydropower, Hua Na Hy hydropower and Khe Bo Hydropower, 8310.1 hectares of mainly forestry land and agricultural land were lost. In another example, the Trung Son hydropower project in Thanh Hoa province, which has been built since 2015, has cleared 78,834 ha of protection forest and production forest land in Quan Hoa and Muong Lat districts, Thanh Hoa Province (Integrated Environments, 2009).

Apart from the loss of forest land, hydropower projects also affected the living community, especially ethnic minorities. The unavoidable relocation to the resettlement site has had a great impact on people's lives. An estimated 5,009 people have been relocated in Ban Ve, Hua Na and Khe Bo hydropower projects. In particular, Ban Ve hydropower is the largest hydropower plant in the North Central Region with the largest number of displaced people in 3,022 households, Hua Na has 1402 households and Khe Bo has 585 households (Table 4). Furthermore, the flow blockage of hydropower plants has changed rivers' natural flow and affected communities in downstream areas. For instance, Ho Ho hydropower project in the province of Quang Tri has changed the flow in downstream area of the Ngan Sau river; consequently, the people in Huong Hoa commune have lost their agricultural land.

**Table 4. The lost area and the number of affected households in some hydropower dams in the Northern Central Vietnam**

No	Hydropower	Province	Total area (ha)	Affected households	
				No of households	Ethnic groups
1	Trung Son	Thanh Hoa	4660	1691	Thai, Muong, Hmong
2	Ban Ve	Nghe An	4663	3022	Thai, Kho-mu
3	Hua Na	Nghe An	2047	1402	Thai, Kho-mu, Tho
4	Quang Tri	Quang Tri	861	341	Bru-Van Kieu
5	Binh Dien	Thua Thien Hue	1,786	64	Katu
6	A Luoi	Thua Thien Hue	1690	259	Ta Oi, Pa Co
7	Huong Dien	Thua Thien Hue	470	77	Pa Co


(Source: Do and Elliot, 2015; Gia, 2015; Thua Thien Hue People's Committee, 2008)

### 3.3. Nature Reserves

Biodiversity of Vietnam in general and of North Central Vietnam in particular has a significant role in nature and human life. Ecosystems are natural habitats in which wildlife species live and bring about many important services to humans (Clarke, 1999). In order to maintain and develop the values of biodiversity sustainably, in the past years, local authorities in the North Central Vietnam have identified, zoned and established systems of areas needing protecting, which have high biodiversity values with a great deal of rare or endangered species.

Under the regulation, currently Vietnam has three systems of protected areas, including the ones in special - use forests, the ones in wetland reserves and those in marine protected areas (Hoang, Tran and Pham, 2015). Among them, the nature reserve is in the protected area of the special-use forest system. By 2016, there had been 9 nature reserves in the North Central Vietnam, covering an area of 264,308 ha (5% of the total area). Except for Quang Binh province, where there is not any nature reserve, the other five provinces have at least one nature reserve. Especially, Thanh Hoa is the province that has the largest number of nature reserves in the North Central Vietnam, with 3 nature reserves.

Nature reserves occupy and use comparatively large areas of land, such as Dakrong Nature Reserve in Quang Tri and Pu Huong Nature Reserve, in the Nghe An province with a large area of 40,526 ha (accounting for 8% of the total area of Quang Tri province) and 40,128 (2% of the total area of Nghe An province).



**Figure 2. The location of Nature Reserves in North Central Vietnam**

Furthermore, most of the sites for setting up nature reserves are natural forest areas, with the abundance and wide range of natural resources, mainly in the upland areas of the North Central provinces, which are the major residence of minority groups. For instance, Pu Huong Nature Reserve, established in 2001, has the forestry area under management located in 12 communes of five different mountainous districts of Quy Hop, Quy Chau, Que Phong, Tuong Duong and Con Cuong in Nghe An province (McElwee, 2002). Similarly, Bac Huong Hoa Nature Reserve in Quang Tri Province was officially established in July 2012 with an area of more than 25,000 ha in 5 communes of Huong Hoa mountain district, Quang Tri province. This is a nature reserve with the 93.2% area of forest coverage, of which primeval forest accounts for nearly 70%, among the highest forest coverage in the country (Lam, 2013).

**Table 5. List of Nature Reserve in North Central Vietnam**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Establishment year</b>	<b>Total area (ha)</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>Affected ethnic minority group</b>
<u>Pu</u> Hu	1999	27,503	Thanh Hoa	Hmong
<u>Pu</u> Luong	1999	16,902	Thanh Hoa	Muong, Thai
<u>Xuan</u> Lien	2000	26304	Thanh Hoa	
<u>Pu</u> Hoat	2013	35,723	Nghe An	Thai, Kho-mu, Hmong
Pu Huong	2001	40,128	Nghe An	Thai, Kho-mu, Hmong, O-Du
Ke Go	1996	21,759	Ha Tinh	
Bac Huong Hoa	2012	25,200	Quang Tri	Bru-Van Kieu
Dakrong	2002	40,526	Quang Tri	Bru-Van Kieu
Phong Dien	2002	30,263	Thua Thien Hue	Pahy
<b>Total</b>		<b>264,308</b>		

(Source: Pham and Khong, 2011; McElwee, 2002)

Supplementary to the positive impacts of the establishment of nature reserves on local and regional natural ecosystems, there are also negative influences on local communities in or nearby the buffer zone of nature reserve. Most of the nine nature reserves in the North Central Region are located in natural forest and mountainous areas, where the majority of the residents are ethnic minority groups. For example, people living around the Bac Huong Nature Reserve are mainly in the ethnic minority group of Bru-Van Kieu with 1,308 households (Lam, 2013). Similarly, the establishment of the Pu Huong Nature Reserve in Nghe An province in 2001 led to the mandatory relocation of 515 households of Thai, Khumu and Hmong minority groups to the new resettlement site (McElwee, 2002). When protected areas are established, local people are limitedly or no longer

able to use natural resources in these new nature reserves, where people used to live together for generations.

Additionally, when local communities formerly residing in the protected area are forced to relocate to new resettlement areas, their post-resettlement life is changed and limited, which influences significantly on the local community life. It can be seen that the use of land resources for cultivating crops and raising livestock is limited, partly because of the land area that is added to the nature reserve. Besides, the culture, indigenous knowledge and traditions of local community groups are affected and changed under the pressure of life, the scarcity of natural resources in the buffer zone. In the case of the ethnic minority community of Bru-Van Kieu, with traditional indigenous knowledge, these local people in the past not only had a stable livelihood but also appropriately used, protected and managed the natural resources. Since the Management Board of the Dakrong Nature Reserve took over the management role instead of the local community as before, it has led to the reduction and change of indigenous knowledge of forest management and protection. Local communities have been increasingly exploiting forest products, depleting natural resources, hunting wild animals to sell to the Kinh people (Le and Le, 2007).

It can be seen the fact that local people are usually put at the greatest disadvantage as they receive the least benefits when protected areas are established is the real issue in the provinces of the North Central Region.

### **3.4. Sedentarization program**

The settlement policies have been paid special attention by the Party and State for a long time. This is the main content of the directives, resolutions of the Party and the Government on the socio-economic development of the mountainous areas with the view to implementing the policies and guidelines of the general ethnic minority policy. Over the past 40 years, the policies of the Party and the Government have been divided into two periods. In each period, the settlement programme has distinctive characteristics of the organizing and implementing.

#### **a. The Period of 1963 - 1990**

The Directive No. 128/TW of February 24, 1959 of the Party on enforcing the operating of the highland mentioned the shifting cultivation and the living conditions of ethnic minorities as well as stated that it was essential to actively guide and help the people to settle in. In the first five-year plan (from 1961 to 1965), the settlement in mountainous areas was clearly confirmed in the 5<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Central Committee (July 1961): "Appropriately carry out the resettlement step by step, help farmers develop agriculture and handicraft industry, set up and begin organized production to improve their living standard of living (The Committee of Ethnic Affairs of the National Assembly, 2000)

The Resolution 38/CP (1968) was an important milestone in the settlement and it was the legal ground to implement the settlement in the country's mountainous areas with the ambition of accomplishing this mission within 3 years. During the 1960s and 1970 years, the resettlement put great effort on calling people to join agricultural cooperatives or work as the paid labours in the state forestry farms. The objectives of the settlement were to stabilize the life and production of the nomadic population, improve the livelihoods of the people by constructing irrigation systems, transmitting virgin soil into paddy fields, permanently cultivating on burnt over land, constructing basic facilities for settlement lives (roads, schools, healthcare centres etc...).

These issues were carried out through co-operatives, which became a large movement in which people were called for quitting their nomadic lifestyles in order to settle in the new, stable living place. The State had various policies on many fields: policies on relocating the people who lived in the lowland to boost labor force for mountainous areas; policies on investing in irrigation systems, reclamation of virgin soil; policies on training human resources for mountainous areas;

policies on circulating and distributing essential commodities, adjusting the agricultural price in the upland, policies on rural development, education and healthcare, policies on constructing new economic zones.

#### **b. Period from 1990 to present**

Among the series of documents and policies on the issues of the settlement, there has been a significant reform since the early 1990s, marked by the Resolution 22/TW of 27<sup>th</sup> November 1989 and the Decision 72/HDBT, dated 13/03/1990. The National Conference on the settlement held in April, 1990 came to a conclusion that the contents and approaches of renovating the settlement in the new situation were the investment in both the projects with the direct aiding approach to households and the construction of infrastructure facilities for the community (regarding the project as the unit).

Since then, the settlement policies have been based more on investment projects and programmers in order to create sustainable development. Changes in the settlement policies have associated with project programmers since the 1990s, focusing on the correlation and integration of the settlement with afforestation and forest development (the Decision 327/QD-TTg ; the Decision No.393/QD-TTg/1996), poverty reduction (the Decision 133/1998/QD-TTg and the Decision 143/1998 / QD-TTg), development of trade in mountainous and ethnic minority areas (the Decree No. 20/1998/ND-CP); development of infrastructure in the communes with extreme difficulties (the Decision No.135/2000/QD-TTg); and now it is the Decision No.143/2001/QD-TTg).

Since 1993, the settlement programme has been carried out in accordance with the framework of the 327-CT Program on afforesting barren land. However, the projects in the 327-

CT Program and the investment mechanism do not guarantee the implementation of the contents of the settlement because the targets and objectives of the both programmers are not the same. Therefore, the Decision No.556/1995/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister, which amended and supplemented the Decision No. 327-CT, has separated the tasks of the settlement programme as a separate one and operated it in accordance with the objectives of socio-economic development with humans as its impacting targets.

Nonetheless, in the process of the implementation of the project programmers integrated with the settlement programme, from the perception that the areas of implementing the settlement is the ones with extremely difficult communes; therefore, the Decision 138/2000 /QD-TTg, dated 29/11/2001, of the Prime Minister made the decision of integrating the projects of the settlement with the Socio-Economic Development Program for extremely difficult communes in mountainous and remote areas. In this decision, the construction of infrastructure of the settlement projects in the Program 135 – listed communes is included in the projects of infrastructure construction of the Program 135. The Decision 143/2001/QD-TTg of the government has classed the settlement project as one of the projects implementing the Program of poverty eradication and funded these projects separately.

The policies have specified the structure of construction investment and group the above programs in the same area of the resettlement communes, such as the settlement projects, the projects of planning resident relocation, the projects of agro-forestry production stabilization, the Program 135, the Program 661, the program of commune grouping centers, the program of aiding ethnic minorities with extreme difficulties, the program of poverty eradication and the program of national clean water.

The contents of the settlement in this period (according to the Decision No.140/1999/QD-BNN-DCDC of October 14, 1999) are: rearranging population, reorganizing production, building the new countryside for ethnic minorities who still lived on sifting cultivation, which contributes to promoting social progress, enforcing the national security and defense. The goals of the settlement programme are to create conditions for ethnic minorities in the mountainous areas who still wander to cultivate and deforest to have houses, stable land or jobs, to reduce poverty and to protect forests and ecological environment. The subjects of the settlement are nomadic households with little or no stable farming land. The main livelihood of these households is based on income from deforestation for 50% or more food production with unstable housing and shifting cultivation. The requirements that the settlement program must achieve are: cultivation activities must be stable in a permanent location; residents permanently inhabiting in one area; at least 80 percent of the household income coming from stable cultivation; the settlement area must ensure the health, education and food.

For the past 40 years, the settlement policies have been constructed as models and applied to all ethnic groups and shifting cultivation groups in order to address five key issues for stabilizing living areas and production.

- Developing and constructing the infrastructure for the settlement areas.
- Calling for the people to settle permanently and migrate from the highland and remote areas to lower areas
- Creating stable production materials (reclamation virgin soil to wet rice land, cultivating in stable burnt over – land, terraced fields, rocky rice paddies or dry fields) to increase productivity of crops.
- Constructing irrigation systems for agriculture and clean water supply.
- Afforesting, zoning for forest protection and development.

The settlement programme is considered as an intervention policy of the State in the development of an ethnic group. First of all, the settlement programme aims at restructuring the distribution and arranging the population, setting up concentrated settlement villages with a stable population scale. On the basis of resettlement villages, the reclamation virgin soil to paddy fields, the expansion of irrigation systems to supply water for fields are considered as a strategy to change the ethnic minority groups' traditional farming practices of burning on sloping land.

Together with the living in settled villages and the introduction of cultivation of paddy rice into the social life of ethnic minorities, other socio-cultural programmers such as the abandonment of outdated practices, superstitions, building new cultural villages, and the provision of healthcare, education services are carried out. Even though the settlement programme has been implemented, shifting cultivation, especially the free migration of ethnic minorities, are still taking place powerfully. The deforestation, the increase of population, the lack of farming land, hunger and poverty, the erosion of ethnic identity are still occurring seriously. The people are not convinced of a stable working life but they come back to live by burning forest for farming. Re-nomadic living state has been ongoing.

### **3.5. Forest Land Allocation**

Forest land allocation (FLA) to individual households in the North Central Coast provinces was carried out in accordance with the Forest Protection and Development Law, promulgated in 1991, allowing the allocation of land to households has the right of lease, transfer, inherit, mortgage, and transfer. Decree No. 64/CP promulgated in 1993 gives people the right to use land for 20 years in the case of land for annual crops and 50 years in land for perennial crops and forest land. The Decree 02/CP on the allocation of land and land to organizations, households and individuals for stable and long-term use for forestry purposes within 50 years. At the same time,

households are allowed to exercise their residual rights, transfers, mortgages, and exchange of use rights to other people according to the 1993 Land Law. Land allocation for individual households aims help individual households better access land. When households receive land and long-term land use rights, households will have incentives, opportunities to improve livelihoods and stabilize their life, and abandon traditional farming practices. In this way of thinking, when household livelihoods are improved and improved, households will have the opportunity to invest in forest development and protection (Jakobsen *et al.*, 2007; Castella *et al.*, 2006). The figure 6 details the rationale of the FLA policy for individual households.

**Table 6. The major Milestones in Policy and Legal Framework**

<b>Timeline</b>	<b>Main of Policies</b>
July 1976	Ministry of Forestry established as a state organization responsible for forestry issues at the national level; benchmark for nationalization of forest resources
Jan 1981	Directive 100CT/TW issued by Central Communist Party, initiating reform in agricultural sector
Dec. 1986	Doi Moi (economic reform) policy launched after the determination of 6th National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party
Apr. 1988	Resolution 10/NQ/TW issued by the Central Communist Party, consolidating reform in the agricultural sector
Aug. 1991	Forest Protection and Development Law passed by the 8th National Assembly, marking an effort to involve local people and different economic sectors in forest protection and development
Jul. 1993	Land Law passed by the 9th National Assembly, stipulating the rights of title holders to lease, exchange, inherit, mortgage, and transfer land-use titles
Jan. 1994	Government Decree 02/CP on allocation of forest land to local organizations, households and individuals
Jan. 1995	Government Decree 01/CP on allocation of land through contracts for agriculture, forestry, and aquaculture purposes
Nov. 1999	Government Decree 163/1999/ND-CP on land allocation and lease for forestry purposes
Nov. 2003	Land Law passed by the 11 <sup>th</sup> National Assembly, recognizing the legal status of communities in land tenure
Dec. 2004	Forest Protection and Development Law passed by 11 <sup>th</sup> National Assembly, recognizing common property as a legal forest management arrangement

(Source: To and Tran, 2014)

According to Decree 02/CP, at provincial level the Forest Protection Department is the Deputy body, meanwhile Cadastral Department is the body to direct the land allocation, process and issue land certificates. At the district level, The Land Allocation Council which consists of Chairman or Vice chairman of District People Committee, Forest Protection Section and Cadastral and agro-forestry sections. The Chairman of District People Committee is also Chairman of the Council, the Forest Protection Section is the deputy body of the Council and Cadastral and agro-forestry sections are members. At commune level, the Chairman or vice Chairman of Commune People Committee is also Chairman of Council, meanwhile Forest, Cadastral officers are members and the Heads of villages are also members, together with members of working groups on land allocation.

As soon as the Decree entered into force, provinces in the North Central region implemented programs not only in the delta region but also in mountainous and highland areas. In Thanh Hoa province, the forestland allocation program has been implemented since 1996 and completed in 1999. (Thanh Hoa DFP, 2000). The scale is implemented on 365 communes in 27 districts, towns and cities of the province. Thanh Hoa province has allocated 375,871 hectares to 102,715 households (Nguyen, 2012). Meanwhile, Nghe An province implemented the program of land allocation under Decree 02/CP from June, 1994 and completed in 2000. Up to date, Nghe An province has over 240,000 ha of forest and forestry land that assigned to individual households. In particular, the area of forest allocation to ethnic minority households is over 183,000 ha, accounting for 76.4% of the total area of forest and forest land in the province. The total number of ethnic minority households was allocated over 112,000 households, of which 96,000 households have been granted land use certificates (Tran, Nguyen and Mai, 2005).

Although the policy clearly regulates implementation steps and specific content in each step, in practice, the implementation of policies in localities due to inadequate human and financial resources is common. Ignore some steps in the implementation process. As in Thanh Hoa, it is estimated that, when implementing forestland allocation, cadres did not carry out specific assignments in the field as required, so many households and individuals only received land, the location was assigned (Nguyen, 2012) In addition, the implementation of state policies is also in conflict with traditional ways of using resources. In one village of Katu, Nam Dong district, Thua Thien Hue province, people do not want to receive land allocated by the state because of the state policy to only allow land use for forestry purposes, but not for upland cultivation (Huizinga, 2012). In addition, in some areas, forest degradation has worsened by forcing people to look for new farming areas and by removing the community's management of forest resources. Facing with many difficulties in meeting the minimum needs for livelihoods, local people have little choice but to exploit the forest more (Hoang, 2009).

## CHAPTER 4

### IMPACTS OF HYDROPOWER DAM CONSTRUCTION ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND LIVELIHOOD CHANGE

#### 4.1. Introduction

An estimated 1.6 billion people depend on forests for their livelihoods (FAO, 2010). In Vietnam, roughly 25 million people—comprising 50 of the country’s 54 official ethnic groups still rely profoundly on the forest for their survival in terms of both subsistence and income generation (Tran and Nguyen, 2007; De Jong, Do and Trieu, 2006). Moreover, forests play a vital role in maintaining the customary laws, traditional governance systems, rituals, culture, and habits of ethnic minorities in Vietnam. Customary law is defined as “a form of local knowledge developed spontaneously in the course of a long history through experience with human behavior and the interactions among people and between man and nature” (CIRUM, 2012). Traditional regulation helps to maintain social order, collective benefits, and community survival. Furthermore, indigenous governance systems contain the institutional authority that governs indigenous political and administrative systems, which direct people’s behavior in terms of natural resource utilization based on customary law (Hlawning, 2006). This governance structure assigns roles and responsibilities that define the use, distribution rights, and benefit sharing of land and natural resources in a coherent social relationship (CIRUM, 2012). Hoang (2006) noted that a good governance system based on customary rules for landownership among the Katu people helped to avoid land disputes inside and outside the community. Similarly, the traditional institutions of the Red Dzao<sup>1)</sup>, mainly related to clans and neighbors, have long been crucial for preserving their cultural identity (CIRUM, 2012). Such systems have played a profound role in maintaining harmonious relationships between ethnic minority communities and their surrounding natural environments (Wells-Dang, Pham and Ngo, 2016). They not only enhance community members’ lives but also promote sustainability in the use and management of natural resources (Oxfam and AAV, 2013). Thus, for indigenous ethnic communities, land and forests have performed crucial functions in terms of both culture and livelihood.

In recent years, however, Vietnam’s government has pressured indigenous ethnic groups to follow official trajectory/direction of modernization, urbanization, and economic growth (Luong and Genotiva, 2008). Because of the national demand for electricity, there has been a considerable increase in land acquisitions from ethnic communities to build hydropower dams. Over the past

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<sup>1)</sup> The Red Dzao people, a subgroup of the Dzao ethnic group, lived in the Ta Phin commune, Sapa district, in northwestern Vietnam. They are called Red Dzao because they used red to decorate their clothes.

20 years, the Vietnamese government has extensively operated 1,967 dams (Dao, 2010). Such hydropower dam construction has dispossessed 620,000 hectares of forest and agricultural land, displacing more than 193,780 people (85% of whom are ethnic minorities) and moving them to resettlement sites (Bui and Schreinemachers, 2011; Pham, 2014) This dispossession of land, where ethnic minorities have lived for a long time with various cultures and beliefs, has noticeably affected the social organization, economic activities, and cultural identity of these groups. In the new resettlement areas, these groups are unable to maintain their traditional livelihoods or observe their cultural practices.

These emergent issues have attracted the attention of many researchers. A case study of the Son La hydropower<sup>2)</sup> project examined its effects on displaced people's incomes. The resettled people experienced significant problems such as land shortages and drops in farm revenues (Bui and Schreinemachers, 2011). Similarly, the A Luoi hydropower dam project<sup>3)</sup> restricted the Ta Oi ethnic minority's access to natural resources, affecting their quality of life as a result of insufficient production land (Pham, Van Westen and Zoomers, 2013). Meanwhile, Tran (2011) suggested that the limitations on local participation in making decisions about resettlement implementation adversely affected the lives of those displaced by the Son La Dam. Many studies have also evaluated the shortcomings of land acquisitions and compensation policies, suggesting a need for contributions from benefit-sharing mechanisms involving multiple stakeholders (Singer and Watanabe, 2014; Singer, Pham and Hoang, 2014; Pham, 2014). Dao (2016) provided good examples of the multiple local strategies adopted by the Thai<sup>4)</sup> and La Ha<sup>5)</sup> people in two villages in response to the socioeconomic, political, and cultural changes caused by the Son La hydropower project. Such strategies involved refusing to move, or delaying it, to "hold out for a better deal with respect to cash payment of compensation or the location of the resettlement site." Some households even went back to their old villages for farming and grazing; others held protests to demand their compensation money from the government. These previous studies have mostly focused on implementation processes, the dilemmas of hydropower policy in terms of compensation, resettlement implementation, and local responses to hydropower dam construction.

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<sup>2)</sup> Son La is the largest hydroelectric power plant in Southeast Asia. It was constructed on the Black river in 2005. The Son La Dam displaced more than 91,100 ethnic minorities in 18,897 households.

<sup>3)</sup> The A Luoi hydropower dam began construction on the A Sap river, A Luoi district, Thua Thien Hue Province, in 2007. It required the involuntary resettlement of 872 people, or 218 households, and dispossessed 2,080 hectares of forest and agricultural land.


<sup>4)</sup> Thai people comprise Vietnam's third-largest ethnic minority among the country's 54 official ethnic minority groups. Their population is estimated to be about 1,550,423 (GSOV, 2010). Members of this minority mainly live in the northwest uplands of Vietnam.

<sup>5)</sup> The La Ha mostly inhabit the Yen Bai and Son La Provinces, and numbered approximately 8,177 people in 2009. They speak the Laha language, which is part of the Tai-Kadai language family.

However, changes in customary governance systems have hardly been investigated. Even though customary governance systems play an importance role in sustaining the livelihoods of ethnic minority communities, these systems face assimilation into mainstream Kinh society via State-making and development projects (Van De Walle and Gunewardena, 2001). Therefore, using a case study of the Katu ethnic minority, this study examines the adverse effects of hydropower development on the livelihoods and local governance of a group forced to resettle in a nearby village.

**4.2. Methodology**

In 2006, the Katu<sup>6)</sup> people were displaced by the Binh Dien hydropower dam project in Huong Tra district, Thua Thien Hue Province. Bo Hon village, the resettlement area for the displaced Katu, was selected as the research site for this study (Figure 3).



**Figure 3. Map of the research area**

(Source: field survey in 2012 and 2013)

This study is based on secondary and primary data. Secondary data were collected from commune and district authorities regarding the process of land acquisition, compensation, and resettlement implementation. Meanwhile, the primary data consisted of household questionnaire surveys, key informant interviews, and focus-group discussions. Twenty-eight households, among a total of 54, were randomly selected for the interviews. Table 7 presents some demographic

<sup>6)</sup> The Katu, regarded as people who live at the headwaters or are watershed dwellers, are among Vietnam’s officially recognized ethnic minorities. There are approximately 61,588 Katu people, predominantly inhabiting the hilly and mountainous areas of Quang Nam (45,715 people) and Thua Thien Hue (14,629 people) (GSOV, 2010). The Katu language is classified in the Mon-Khmer subgroup of the Austroasiatic linguistic group.

information about the 28 respondents who participated in the survey.

**Table 7. Characteristics of household respondents**

<b>Type</b>	<b>persons</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Gender</b>		
- Male	23	82
- Female	5	18
<b>Average age (48 years old)</b>		
>65	6	21
56–65	1	4
46–55	5	18
36–45	10	36
26–35	6	21
15–25	0	0
<b>Education</b>		
- Illiterate	11	39
- Primary school	15	54
- Secondary school	2	7
- High school	0	0


(Source: field survey in 2013)

In our survey, 82% of the respondents were male and 18% were female. The highest proportion (36%) was in the range of 36–45 years of age. Most respondents were not well educated, with an average educational level of second grade.

The questionnaire focused on the households' general livelihoods before and after resettlement. It also sought information about resettlement implementation, changes in customary governance, and specific livelihood activities. The authors used semi-structured key informant interviews. Two groups were delineated for the focus-group discussions. Each group had five people consisting of young people, elders, and women. The reason for organizing groups of different ages was to help the villagers interact with each other and discuss different subjects. The discussions mainly focused on community changes in terms of both livelihood and governance before and after displacement. Interviewees were also asked about current problems they faced following resettlement to evaluate how hydropower dam construction affected their lives. The research was mainly conducted in December 2012 and June 2013.

### 4.3. Outline of Bo Hon village

According to the patriarch<sup>7)</sup>, the Katu people in Bo Hon village were originally from Nghia village, Huong Nguyen commune, A Luoi district, located in the watershed of the Huu Trach<sup>8)</sup> river. In 1975, when the farmland became infertile, the whole village decided to move. This farming habit was known as shifting cultivation. The new settlement was called Lac village, and it was within the same territory as the Huong Nguyen commune (Figure 4). The new area had abundant land available for their use. Their main subsistence crops were dry rice and cassava.



**Figure 4. Map of the Bo Hon village site, 1975 to present**

(Source: field survey in 2012 and 2013)

In 1995, a large flood destroyed most houses, fields, and assets. Thirty-six households in Lac village voluntarily migrated to a natural forest area belonging to the Binh Thanh commune of Huong Tra district. The new settlement was called Bo Hon, based on a well-known tree species found in the area. This area had limited accessibility because of a narrow road. Local people mainly

<sup>7)</sup> A village patriarch (*Già Làng*) is usually an older leader of a village or community. He is a dignitary in the villages of the ethnic minorities in the highlands of Vietnam, previously regarded as a spiritual leader. In Katu communities, the village patriarch takes the main responsibility for social and natural resource management and resolution.

<sup>8)</sup> The Huu Trach River is one of three main tributaries of the Huong River (Huu Trach, Ta Trach, and Bo Rivers). The Huu Trach River originates from a mountainous height of more than 500 m in the east of the A Luoi-Nam Dong districts. It flows southwest to northeast and meets the Ta Trach River at the Bang Lang fork. The two rivers join to form the Huong River, the largest river in Thua Thien Hue Province. The Huu Trach River is 50 km long and has a basin area of 729 km<sup>2</sup>.

used the waterways along the Huu Trach River to go to a nearby market. Given the constraints on transportation, the communities there experienced limited government intervention, even though the area is formally administrated by the People’s Committee of Huong Binh Commune. In 1997, five Kinh<sup>9)</sup> households migrated to this village to operate small businesses. In 1998, the People’s Committee of Binh Thanh Commune officially approved Bo Hon as a village and issued Vietnamese ID cards. In 2002, with support from an American organization, a primary school was built in the village.

In 2006, the energy demand of the industrial sector, as a driver of economic growth, led to an increase in hydroelectric dam construction in Thua Thien Hue Province, Central Vietnam. Such construction had major effects on Bo Hon village since all lands and assets were inundated. Therefore, the whole Bo Hon community was forcibly resettled to a new site. The resettlement site is also called Bo Hon. The village has 54 families and 257 inhabitants; 49 households are Katu and five are Kinh.

**4.4. Livelihoods and local governance in Bo Hon village before Binh Dien hydropower construction**

**a. Livelihoods**

The old Bo Hon village had abundant natural forest as well as clean-water sources from the Huu Trach River. The total area of the village before resettlement was estimated at 200–250 hectares. All land and natural resources were commonly owned by the villagers. The table 8 below shows the details of landownership in the old village.

**Table 8. Landownership in Bo Hon village**

Type of land	Ownership	User	Land use
Protected land	Collective	Community	Primary forest
Common land	Collective	Community	Bamboo
Production land	Collective	Individual	Dry rice, bamboo, cassava
Residential land	Collective	Individual	Vegetables, fruits

(Source: field survey in 2013)

In the old village, the Katu distinguished protected forest areas from those used for production. Protected forest, the dwelling place of sacred forest spirits, usually included primary forest and watershed areas that all villagers had to manage and protect. Meanwhile, production

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<sup>9)</sup> The Kinh are the majority ethnic group in Vietnam, comprising 85.7% of the population in the 2009 census. They are officially known as Vietnamese to distinguish them from other ethnic groups in Vietnam.

forest areas were used as sources of income and nourishment. The community planted bamboo trees to cover expenses for village celebrations such as the Buffalo Sacrifice Festival. On the other hand, individuals used production forest areas for shifting cultivation, hunting, and gathering non-timber forest products (hereafter NTFPs<sup>10</sup>). Production forest was openly accessible to all households, who could claim as much land as they needed for cultivation. According to the survey data from 28 households, each family could cultivate an average of 3.8 hectares, on which they planted bamboo, dry rice, cassava, and so on. Since they had a large amount of farmland, most households had enough rice to eat year-round. The main sources of household income included bamboo trees planted in large areas and dry rice and cassava planted on swidden land on the other side of the river. Trees could be sold at high prices. Estimated household earnings from bamboo trees ranged from 3,500 VND to 5,000 VND<sup>11</sup> per tree during the period 2000–2004. Furthermore, subsistence livelihoods derived from many different sources, including both natural forest and river resources. Honey, wood, rattan, and conical leaves were collected from the forest. The wood was used as fuel for cooking or to build houses, while the other products generated extra income. The river was used for various purposes, including food and water sources needed for daily activities. Small fish were caught in the river. Aside from the ample natural resources available for subsistence, most interviewed households agreed that the old settlement had fertile soil that required no additional fertilizer for cultivation.


#### **b. Local governance systems**

The customary governance system in the old Bo Hon village had three levels: village, clans, and households. The highest structural unit was the village. Figure 5 shows the customary Katu governance system in the old Bo Hon village.

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<sup>10</sup> A non-timber forest product (NTFPs) is any product or service other than timber that is produced in a forest. NTFPs can include fruits and nuts, vegetables, fish and game, medicinal plants, resins, and essences, as well as a range of barks and fibers, such as bamboo, rattans, and other palms and grasses.

<sup>11</sup> Approximately 0.2 USD–0.3 USD at that time; 16,055 VND = 1 USD in 2006.



**Figure 5. Local governance system before resettlement**

(Source: field survey in 2013)

The organization operated through a self-governing apparatus comprising the patriarch, elder council and military leader. The elder council had an unlimited number of members. The council had superior knowledge and experience regarding beliefs, traditions, and customs. Villagers elected a prestigious man from the elder council as a patriarch, who was responsible for managing all socioeconomic and cultural activities of the community.

As a community representative, the patriarch had the power to smoothly govern the village. His role was to harmonize relationships among the villagers in exploiting natural resources and to ensure subsistence for the community members. The self-governing apparatus managed the community based on customary laws. The patriarch assumed primary responsibility for all land and forest management. The protected forest area normally included primary forest and watershed areas that every villager had to protect. Such beliefs undergird the customary norms and custom-based institutions established, practiced, and developed by the Katu. The patriarch and the elder council determined the location of the sacred forest and regulated its protection. Logging, farming, and hunting were strictly forbidden in the sacred forest. Villagers who violated these regulations were fined and had to pay with a buffalo, pig, or chicken, depending on the severity of the violation as assessed by the patriarch and the elder council.

The third most important person in the governance system was the military leader. He assisted the patriarch in resolving conflicts among villagers. He was also responsible for the village's security and for defending the sacred forest against illegal exploitation from inside and outside the community.

#### **4.5. Implementing land acquisition, compensation, and resettlement in the new Bo Hon village**

In 2005, the Binh Dien hydropower dam was built for multiple purposes on the Huu Trach River (Figure 3). Aside from generating electricity, the initial intention was flooding prevention and irrigation in the lowland areas. The dam is located in two communes of Huong Tra district:

the Binh Dien and Binh Thanh communes. It is a medium-sized hydropower plant that can generate 44 mw of electricity and provide 181 million kWh of electricity. It cost approximately 1.1 trillion VND or 5.3 million USD<sup>12)</sup>. As a result of this construction project, 1,786 hectares of natural forest and agricultural land disappeared in the Huong Tra, A Luoi, and Huong Thuy districts of Thua Thien Hue Province. The Binh Dien Hydropower Company collaborated with the Board of Compensation, Assistance, and Resettlement, which consisted of various government representatives from the district, commune, and village levels. The board had a significant role in the process of land acquisition, clearance, compensation, and resettlement.

The centralized decision-making processes involved limited participation by the local people affected by the dam's construction. First, an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report had to be approved by the Thua Thien Hue Provincial People's Committee. However, the displaced people were seemingly unaware of the approval since there was no feedback mechanism or consultation with the communities to revise the decision. Second, the Vietnamese government reserves the right to withdraw lands from local people for public purposes. In the old Bo Hon village, the residents did not have certificates to prove landownership. From the government's perspective, those lands were illegally occupied, and it did not compensate Bo Hon villagers for the land, even though many villagers remonstrated against the decision. The villagers received cash compensation only for their assets based on estimates by the Board of Compensation, Assistance, and Resettlement. The board visited each household to measure plants and graves. Compensation for damages ranged from 20 to 100 million VND (1,246 to 6,229 USD at that time). Third, aside from compensation, the government helped to build houses, allocating land to individuals in the resettlement area. Yet, most villagers preferred to build their homes themselves because they could save money by re-using materials from their old houses. That way, they could also ensure the quality of construction. The government, however, did not agree to provide monetary compensation for their houses. As a result, a house with a uniform size of 73 m<sup>2</sup> made of concrete, metal frames, and zinc roofs was allocated to each household. Each house cost 60 million VND (3,737 USD in 2006). The villagers complained about the quality of the houses and the high construction costs. Further, both residential and agricultural lands with land certificates issued by the government were allocated to households. To ensure equal distribution among households, the government used a lottery to allocate land. Villagers received support for livelihood restoration, including fertilizer, pesticides, livestock, and training in new cultivation techniques. In addition, for one year each household received a subsidy of 12 kg of rice every

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<sup>12)</sup> In 2006, 16,055 VND = 1 USD.

month. They did not have to pay for electricity during the first year. The details of the compensation package and support for livelihood restoration are shown in Table 9.

**Table 9. Compensation package and support from project**

No.	Category	Unit	Total
1	Land	m <sup>2</sup> /household	2,000
2	House	VND/house	60,000,000
3	Crops and graves	VND/household	19,752,652
4	Job changes	VND/household	11,946,348
5	Livelihood support	VND/household	11,876,721
6	Food	kg/household/month	12

(Source: Binh Dien Hydropower Company, 2013)

The compensation package and support from the Binh Dien hydropower project were only temporary, intended to support the villagers' livelihoods after displacement. Land and natural resources, which were important for the villagers' livelihoods, were not appropriately distributed, and the cash compensation could not be considered equivalent to the alternative sources needed to regain their livelihoods in the resettlement.

#### **4.6. Impact on livelihoods and local governance after resettlement**

##### **a. Impoverishment of local livelihoods**

The resettlement site is located within the territory of Binh Thanh commune, approximately 5–7 km from the old Bo Hon village. It is not far from the center of the Binh Thanh commune (about 2 km). The village has good infrastructure, including a wide road connecting it to other communes and cities. The local market is only about 15 minutes away, and it takes about 40 minutes to get to Hue by motorbike. Moreover, the government supplied drinking water and electricity.

At the new site, the government allocated 35 hectares of land for displaced people. However, this new village does not have a natural forest. There is only a small plot of land available for public purposes, such as village roads, a kindergarten, a primary school, and a village common house. Most of the land is residential and agricultural.

Villagers' livelihoods changed after the resettlement. Landholdings are too small to generate enough income to sustain the households. While households with small residential land area grow lemongrass<sup>13)</sup>, fruits, or vegetables for subsistence, the households owning agricultural land plant

<sup>13)</sup> Few households sell lemongrass at the market. Per kg cost is 7,000 VND–10,000 VND.

bamboo, acacia, and cassava to sell. The amount of agricultural land after resettlement was much smaller than before (0.09–10 hectares before resettlement versus 0.03–0.2 hectares after resettlement) (Table 10).

**Table 10. Landholdings before and after resettlement**

No.	No. of hh members	Hh head age	Education level	Landholdings before resettlement (ha)		Landholdings after resettlement (ha)	
				Residence	Agriculture	Residence	Agriculture
1	13	72	7	0.02	7	0.05	0.10
2	3	34	2	0.01	1	0.05	0.05
3	3	38	6	0.04	1	0.05	0.10
4	7	67	0	0.025	0.09	0.05	0.05
5	5	60	3	0.04	1	0.05	0.03
6	7	54	2	0.2	0.5	0.05	0.06
7	6	42	0	0.2	7	0.05	0.05
8	2	32	5	0.1	3	0.05	0.05
9	5	44	3	0.06	9	0.05	0.06
10	6	66	0	0.04	3.08	0.05	0.10
11	4	35	0	0.035	4	0.05	0.05
12	3	67	0	0.02	1	0.05	0.05
13	7	37	0	0.1	1	0.05	0.05
14	2	42	5	0.03	7	0.05	0.05
15	6	52	3	0.3	4	0.05	0.05
16	6	49	0	0.5	2	0.05	0.05
17	7	41	0	0.06	0.25	0.05	0.20
18	5	41	0	0.1	10	0.05	0.06
19	5	80	1	0.01	0.2	0.05	0.10
20	3	27	0	0.03	0.8	0.05	0.10
21	4	35	0	0.06	2	0.05	0.10
22	4	37	2	0.25	9	0.05	0.05
23	3	30	5	0.3	4	0.05	0.10
24	6	40	2	0.08	6	0.05	0.05

25	3	49	1	0.15	7	0.05	0.05
26	3	36	3	0.0035	1	0.05	0.05
27	6	80	2	0.004	10	0.05	0.10
28	5	54	0	0.06	1	0.05	0.10
<b>Sum</b>				<b>2.83</b>	<b>102.92</b>	<b>1.39</b>	<b>2.00</b>
<b>Avg.</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>47.9</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>3.68</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.07</b>

(Source: field survey in 2013)

Obviously, there was a sharp decrease in both residential and agricultural land after resettlement. The average size of agricultural landholdings per household is only 0.07 hectares. Judging from the household interviews and group discussions, such land limitations currently pose considerable challenges.

Aside from the decrease in agricultural land, the fertility of the land is problematic as well. Twenty-five of the 28 households said the land quality after resettlement was worse than before (Table 11).

**Table 11. Opinion of land quality after resettlement**

<b>Opinion</b>	<b>Number of households</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Better than before resettlement	1	3.6
Same as before resettlement	2	7.1
Worse than before resettlement	25	89.4

(Source: field survey in 2013)

Poor soil quality has forced households to use additional inputs to grow crops. In total, 71.4% of the interviewed households used chemical fertilizer, at a cost of 400,000 to 1 million VND per year (25–62 USD). Meanwhile, 28.5% said they could not afford fertilizer; therefore, their crops did not yield good production. The small amount of agricultural land and poor soil quality have adversely affected household incomes. Monthly household income has significantly declined by 35%, compared to those before resettlement.

Second, livelihood sources have changed from heavy dependence on natural forests to intensive agriculture. Access to natural forests for shifting cultivation and NTFPs has been restricted. The current site is far away from the natural forest—one and a half hours by boat, followed by an hour-long walk—which is under state control. Therefore, villagers are forced to

grow crops on a limited amount of land with poor soil quality. Acacia, which was introduced by the WB3<sup>14)</sup> project, along with bamboo and cassava are popular plants in the displacement site.

**b. Decline of the customary governance system**

In addition to significant transformations in livelihood, the governance system also changed after displacement. Obviously, land and natural resources were the foundation for the social organization, economic system, spirituality, and cultural identity of the Katu. Construction of the Binh Dien hydropower dam displaced this community from its customary land, and the subsequent land acquisition, compensation, and resettlement have threatened the continuation of community structure and customary practices. Currently, the land is managed by the government. Traditionally, the village patriarch and elder council assumed responsibility for land allocation and natural resource management. However, the government now assumes these duties. In the resettlement village, the government allocated land to each household. Thus, the village patriarch plays a less important role since commonly held property no longer exists. Customary community-based ownership has been replaced with a statutory land-rights system. The government issued land certificates to each villager when land allocation was implemented. According to Vietnam’s Land Law, all land belongs to the entire population, with the government acting as the owner’s representative. Moreover, the government determines the objectives and functions of land use following land-use planning. Table 12 shows a comparison of landownership and natural resource management before and after resettlement.


**Table 12. Change in landownership and natural resource management**

Type	Before resettlement	After resettlement
Land tenure	Communal	Owner’s state representative
Land-use right	Informal	Formal
Land allocation	Patriarch	Government
Resource access		
- Forest	Freely access	Strictly controlled
- River	Freely access	Limited
Violation sanction of land and natural resources	Customary law	Statutory law

(Source: field survey in 2013)

<sup>14)</sup> WB3 project funded by World Bank since 2012 in Vietnam. Thua Thien Hue Province was one of four Province implemented this project. It aimed to promote the smallholder involve in the forest plantation. The World Bank supported both the financial and technical for individual household to plant the acacia.

Moreover, villagers are not allowed to access other lands or forest. They can only use the land the government allocated to them. All natural resources are under the strict management and protection of local officials. Villagers cannot exploit land in this area. In addition, villagers must follow government regulations; customary rules no longer have effect. The local government based on the law resolves Land disputes. The sacred forest used to worship nature spirits was entirely wiped out by the resettlement, and traditional Katu ceremonies and rituals (e.g., the Buffalo Sacrifice Festival) occur less frequently. Thus, the role of the patriarch as the main festival organizer has diminished. Additionally, the People’s Committee of the Commune introduced a new local governance system (Figure 6). A village head, a Communist Party secretary, and a village association were introduced. They manage village activities according to government-based law and policies. The patriarch now only has influence over ceremonies and festivals. The village head’s obligations are to form a connection between the commune authority and the villagers. He is chosen by the People Committee of the Commune<sup>15)</sup>. The patriarch has clearly become less powerful; he no longer takes the main responsibility for all community activities.



**Figure 6. Local governance after resettlement**

(Source: field survey in 2013)

The elder council is not recognized in the current local governance system. The position of Communist Party secretary has its basis in the ruling political party of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. A key responsibility of the secretary is to ensure that Party members abide by the Party’s Resolution and government laws.

<sup>15)</sup> In order to easily communicate and work with local authority, the village head should be a person who can fluently speak and write in Vietnamese; meanwhile the existing Patriarch only speak quite good in Vietnamese. Therefore, among the villagers in Bo Hon village, the People Committee of the Commune appoint the new Village head. He received monthly allowance, approximately 1 million VND, meanwhile the Patriarch did not received any allowance.

#### **4.7. Discussion**

To elucidate the effects of the involuntary displacement of local ethnic minority upland groups, this case study examined how the customary governance system and local livelihoods are undergoing rapid and extensive changes stemming from a dam development project in Central Vietnam.

The results point to a collapse of the Katu people's customary political system during and after the resettlement process. The village patriarch, a customary leader in Katu society, is the representative who exercises the functions of the customary governance system—namely, managing land under communal ownership and distributing land to households within community boundaries. However, the collapse of the customary system has had two main consequences: 1) the exclusion of common property on customary land via the land acquisition process and 2) the replacement of the customary system with an official system for land allocation and individual ownership. Along similar lines, Hoang (2011) noted that the nationalization of forests for the establishment of the Khau Li National Nature Reserve gradually eliminated the customary communal ownership system of the Thai people. That study showed that shifting control over forests from local institutions to centralized agencies became a primary cause of deforestation. Local people no longer managed or protected forests according to their customary management principles; rather, they cut timber because it had become a valuable commodity. Forest degradation and “forest theft” resulted from government control over the country's natural forests (Hoang, 2011). McElwee (2011) also examined the threats of changes to communal property customs. In a case study of Ha Tinh Province, it was found that the government excluded common property regimes via land allocation, which placed burdens on the livelihoods of poor households. Likewise, in the case of Bo Hon village, displacement also negatively affected local livelihoods in terms of land reduction and marginalizing natural resources.

Looking broadly at various programs, the same results are observed in other regions of the Vietnamese uplands in terms of the transformation of ethnic societies—namely, a decreased presence of customary laws accompanied by the dominance of statutory laws and official institutions. It is surprising that, even with a growing body of literature on the importance of maintaining communal landownership under customary institutions for sustainable natural-resource management, the government has continued its efforts to replace such systems through various programs since the new economic reforms (Kim and Truong, 2013; CIRUM, 2012; McElwee, 2011; Ostrom, 1990). Customary institutions consisting of communal landownership, rituals, and customary ethnic laws are at heart of rural governance, political stability, and sustainable development for local livelihoods (CIRUM, 2012). Regarding the upland transformation in Vietnam, Sikor (2011) affirms that the uplands are viewed not only as a frontier

to be exploited for valuable natural resources to support the “national interest” but also as places to expand government power under various state-making programs. The foremost intention of state intervention is to integrate the various ethnic groups in the highlands who have diverse cultures, knowledge, social institutions, livelihoods, and natural resources (Nguyen, 2016; Sikor, 2011; Ducan, 2004). There seems to be no compelling reason to argue that, aside from nationalizing resources, the government has tried to assimilate the Bo Hon community into the national society under state control. The government established a new landownership system with new land-management actors, a new administrative system, and cash-crop farming practices. However, these actions have not only removed the resources needed to sustain the livelihoods of the Katu but also denied and subjugated their customary rights and culture, to the point of eliminating local knowledge. Land acquisition in the old village and land allocation in the new resettlement have been central to reconstructing landownership from communal to individual ownership.

The case of Bo Hon village shows that forced displacement for the construction of the Binh Dien hydropower dam completely marginalized the Katu people socio-politically. The main reasons for this shortcoming are as follows. Implementation proceeded without regard for the traditional culture and production space of the Katu people, which played important roles in the community’s survival prior to 2006. The government deprived them of their customary land rights via land acquisition without compensation. Moreover, this was conducted with little respect for traditional customs, causing not only the destruction of natural resources and environmental degradation but also a disruption of the Katu’s harmonious ways of living.

Land acquisition for hydropower construction is beneficial for most people and businesses in the lowlands, including urban electricity users, service enterprises in the cities, companies in industrial zones, and so on. Meanwhile, ethnic minorities in the mountainous areas, where 90% of the hydropower projects take place, face negative effects. The government focuses only on the economic interests of the majority population while neglecting the socioeconomic implications for the minority. The government should give thorough consideration to the long-term socioeconomic harm inflicted on minority groups when developing projects.

#### **4.8. Conclusion**

This study focused on a Katu community in Central Vietnam that was displaced and resettled by the Binh Dien hydropower dam. The Katu ethnic minority clearly experienced tremendous changes in their livelihoods and governance system as a result from hydropower construction development. Before the resettlement, the community relied heavily on natural forest resources for its income. Under common village ownership, households could claim new lands and access natural forests and river resources according to their needs. The local people still followed their

customary system of governance, which played a crucial role in the use of natural resources, village organization, the regulation of social relationships, and community activities. Natural resources were controlled by the community under the leadership of a village patriarch.

In 2006, however, during the involuntary resettlement of Bo Hon village for the Binh Dien dam project, the government did not allocate land based on local custom. As a result, the villagers' livelihoods were adversely affected. Landholdings in the new village were too small to generate sustainable income. Livelihood sources changed from heavy dependence on natural forests to intensive agriculture. However, household incomes significantly declined, increasing poverty in Bo Hon village.

The community members lost customary ownership of their lands, receiving small plots of residential land allocated under the government ownership system. The people of Bo Hon village also lost their right to access the natural forest, which is now strictly controlled by the government. This is directly contrary to the village's customary governance system. Moreover, the village patriarch now plays a less important role because commonly held property, which used to be allocated by the patriarch, no longer exists. With the new local governance system introduced by the People's Committee of the Commune, the village patriarch now competes with the village head. The duties of the village head are to form a connection between the government at the commune level as a representative of the Communist Party and the villagers in the community.

The implementation of the Binh Dien hydropower dam construction project did not pay proper attention to the customary local system or the entitlement to forestland and other common resources. This had significant effects on local governance and livelihoods. The results of this study suggest that the non-recognition of ethnic minorities' customary rights to land and customary governance can substantially impoverish local livelihoods.

## CHAPTER 5

### PU HU NATURE RESERVE ESTABLISHMENT AND RESPONSE OF HMONG PEOPLE

#### 5.1. Introduction

Vietnam's upland is inhabited by more than 14 million people from ethnic minorities (Rambo and Jamieson, 2003). Well into the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, people living in the uplands used land under a variety of customary property arrangements tied to customary politico-legal institutions. Uplanders hold their own customary systems of land tenure, governance systems, and traditional practices of farming, *i.e.* swidden cultivation. Customary law is the legal constitution of a village, including civil and criminal codes, and other articles on preserving the ethics, customs, and habits related to social organization as well as to the life of the village. Local regulations enshrine customary village laws that attempt to place restrictions on the withdrawal of resources from common lands (McElwee, 2011)

Today, Vietnam's uplands societies are faced with the loss of autonomy and problems of dependency on the politico-administrative body (Rambo and Jamieson, 2003). The nationalization and privatization of land and natural resources were largely implemented in the Vietnam uplands beginning in 1986. Large areas of land and natural resources, accessed and managed by forest-dependent peoples, have been confiscated to serve global and national interests in biodiversity conservation in Vietnam since 1990 (Zingerli, 2005). The Vietnamese government set up many Protected Areas, which consist of the National Park and a Nature Reserve, for protection and environmental and biodiversity conservation. Currently, there are 164 Protected Areas established under sponsorship from both the Vietnamese government and international organizations (Do, Krott and Böcher, 2017). Meanwhile, the land used for the protected areas significantly expanded from 880,000 hectares in 1986 to 2.4 million hectares in 2006 (Dressler, To and Mahanty, 2013). This type of conservation largely excluded local rights of access to and the use of natural resources. Consequently, forest-dependent peoples lost local commons previously used for their traditional livelihood activities (Hoang, 2011; McElwee, 2010). The process of the Vietnamese government's nationalizing of common village lands can be seen in forest land allocation (Sikor, 2011b). Former communal lands were privatized, and land rights were changed based on a market-oriented land tenure system (McElwee, 2011). Furthermore, the local community has experienced the gradual loss of local commons and their subsistence needs have been threatened (McElwee, 2011). However, many studies on ethnic minorities in Vietnam found that local people are neither passive nor do they accept the status created by the state and more powerful people (Sowerwine, 2004; Scott, 2000). These ethnic peoples have employed different strategies in their everyday practices

to respond to state intervention. Thus, the results of state intervention have produced a diversity of outcomes. State intervention has proceeded smoothly in some areas but has not been completed in others.

The concept of a 'Moral Economy' was introduced by Scott (1976) and emphasized that the norm of reciprocity and the norm of subsistence play an important role for peasant prevention of the risks from state intervention. Much of the existing scholarship on the Moral Economy, however, has approached the subject from an intra-ethnic perspective. For example, the studies by McElwee (2007) in Ha Tinh Province, North Vietnam, indicated the redistribution of income from rich to poor household as a social obligation and the dependence on common land as a social right between villagers. Adams (1993) also reported a similar case in West Africa. The Bambara tribe in Mali set up the non-market claims and transfers in a variety of forms, ranging from cereal gifts and livestock loans to migrant remittances and labor exchange based on kinship, friendship, and patronage to cope with food insecurity. Likewise, the intra-ethnic perspective was strongly represented in the two case studies of the Dao and Black Thai villages in Vietnam (Sowerwine, 2004; Scott, 2000). The previous studies related to the Moral Economy, however, constrained their scope to the intra-ethnic relationship, and did not engage with the 'subsistence ethic' of both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic relationships, even though through an inter-ethnic relationship, an intra-ethnic relationship can be fostered to mitigate state intervention. Therefore, building on Scott's contribution of the Moral Economy (Scott, 1976), this paper aims to identify the roles of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic relationships among the ethnic minorities in the processes of local responses to state intervention through the case study of the Hmong ethnic minority in North Central Vietnam. The authors argued that state approval of the legitimate and statutory law excluding the local right to use natural resources threatens social norms and subsistence needs. The local responses, however, functioned as a 'risk-avertter' against state interventions. The intra and inter-ethnic relationships based on the 'subsistence ethic' help locals successfully mitigate state intervention.

## **5.2. Methodology**

This paper uses an upland village in North Central Vietnam as a case study, where a local community was affected by biodiversity conservation and forest land allocation. In 1998, the Hmong people were displaced by the Pu Hu Nature Reserve establishment in Suoi Ton hamlet, Phu Son commune, Quan Hoa district, Thanh Hoa Province. Our research is mainly based on key informant interviews and household questionnaire surveys. First, we conducted key informant interviews with three staff of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve, Quan Hoa Forest Protection Department (FPD) and the officials in charge of land management in the commune. Interviewees took the main

responsibility for managing the Pu Hu Nature Reserve as well as for the implementation of forest land allocation in the Suoi Ton hamlet. The focus of the interviews was mainly to understand the resettlement process, activities for the management of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve and the process of forest land allocation in the research site. Furthermore, the authors interviewed the village leader of the Muong people in Khoa hamlet, who shared land with the Hmong people in the new resettlement site. The authors investigated the Muong's motivation and reasons for this act of sharing. Additionally, we interviewed the communist party leader who was a former village head, the village head, two persons who are leaders of a clan, and five households. The aim is to understand the social-economic and political state of the community before resettlement, and how community activities respond to state intervention. Finally, fourteen households among a total of sixty-four, which represent the diverse responses of the local Hmong regarding their resistance to the state intervention, were randomly selected for interviews. The semi-structured questionnaire focused on household livelihoods before and after state intervention. Also, the authors determined household responses to state intervention, especially the sharing of land among households in instances in which they lost land due to the Pu Hu Nature Reserve establishment. The recall method, used to collect data on condition before resettlement, relies on the memories of respondents. In order to avoid mis-memories related to events occurring 20 years ago, we interviewed different types of actors to cross-check their memories, which made our data reliable enough to reconstruct the situation before resettlement.

Data were collected during three principal periods of fieldwork: 12<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> June 2015, 16<sup>th</sup>-27<sup>th</sup> November 2015 and 24<sup>th</sup> February-15<sup>th</sup> March 2017<sup>16)</sup>. Table 13 presents the characteristics of household respondents. The respondents were mostly male, accounting for 86% of the sample. The highest proportion (36%) was 46-55 years of age. The hometown of most respondents was Yen Bai Province and 93% of households have lived there for more than 20 years.

**Table 13. Characteristics of household respondents**

Type	Persons	%
Gender		
- Male	12	86
- Female	2	14
Average age (55 years old)		
>65	3	21

<sup>16)</sup> Due to the large number of respondents who speak only the Hmong language, the authors employed a local Hmong who is young and speaks Vietnamese fluently as interpreter. In order to avoid translation misunderstanding, we also conducted cross-checking during all the field surveys.

56–65	2	14
46–55	5	36
36–45	4	29
26–35	0	0
15–25	0	0
<b>Hometown</b>		
- Yen Bai Province <sup>17)</sup>	12	86
- Son La Province <sup>18)</sup>	2	14
<b>Living experience</b>		
- Less than 20 years	1	7
- More than 20 years	13	93
<b>No. of household member</b>		
- Less than 5	1	7
- Between 5 and 7	6	43
- More than 7	7	50

(Source: field survey in 2017)

The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. The first section will describe the history and the geography of the study area. Second, social-economic and political Hmong communities before the state intervention are illustrated. Third, we present the process of the displacement program for the Pu Hu Nature Reserve establishment. The fourth section describes how the state intervention process was implemented at the research site, after which we focus on local responses which mitigate those of the state. The final section attempts to develop our discussion within the concept of the moral economy from the perspectives of both intra and inter-ethnic relationships.


### 5.3. Outline of the research site

The research site is the Suoi Ton hamlet. This hamlet is located at the North-Western frontier of Thanh Hoa province, 200 km from Thanh Hoa City (Figure 7). Reaching the hamlet requires a

<sup>17)</sup> Yen Bai Province lies in the west of Vietnam's northern region. The population of Yen Bai province as of 2009 was 743,400 persons. This province is the home of 30 different groups of people, of which the Kinh, the ethnic majority, accounts for about 54%, ethnic minorities for more than 40% including Tay, Thai, Dao, and Hmong. There were 81,921 Hmong people (11%) in Yen Bai Province. They mainly resided in Mu Cang Chai (53%), Tram Tau (25%) and Van Chan (12%) district. The hometown of respondents were Tram Tau and Van Chan district.

<sup>18)</sup> Son La Province is one of six North-western provinces in Vietnam. The population of Son La as of 2009 was 1,007,500 persons. This province is inhabited by 34 ethnic groups, of which Thai (54%), Kinh (18%) and Hmong (12%) account for more than 80% of the province's population.

three-hour drive from Thanh Hoa City. This hamlet was affected by the displacement program for the Pu Hu Nature Reserve establishment in 1998. Resettled people from Suoi Ton hamlet were Hmong.



**Figure 7. Location of research site**

Before 1998, this Hmong ethnic group had been living in Cha Lat hamlet 30 km away from the new resettlement site. Cha Lat hamlet was in the depths of the mountains where locals had lived in relative isolation. The hamlet was accessible only by foot, and it took one to two days walk to commute to its centre. Historically, people originally came from Yen Bai Province and Son La Province in the North Vietnam Uplands. In their hometown, a rotational swidden farming system was traditionally practised by households. While their farmlands were no longer sustainable for cultivation, they decided to find a new place. In 1992, the first lineage of 13 households in the Mua clan of Hmong people in Son La Province migrated to the Cha Lat hamlet<sup>19)</sup>.

<sup>19)</sup> The households received information from their Hmong friends who lived close to the Cha Lat hamlet. Subsequently, this group shared information with their relatives or friends in both the Son La and Yen Bai Province. For instance, the 50-year-old's household interviews explained that he knew information on the Cha Lat hamlet from his younger brother who migrated there in 1994. Meanwhile, in his hometown, he had three-four ha available for cultivation. However, the land quality was no longer good for growing crops. The land required too much labor to remove grass, and it did not cultivate well.

Two clans of Vang and Giang in Yen Bai Province then settled in the hamlet between 1993 and 1994. In 1996, most of the Mua clan of the Hmong people in Yen Bai Province migrated to the Cha Lat hamlet. Until 1997, there were approximately 109 households and 652 people living in this hamlet. As a result, there were four main clans in this community: Mua (Son La), Vang, Giang and Mua (Yen Bai).


On February 9, 1998, the government established the Pu Hu Nature Reserve under the *Decision No. 577/BNN-KH* of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) (CRES and VNU, 2015). The total area of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve was 27,503 hectares, in which 16,265 hectares is a strictly protected area, and 11,238 hectares is an ecological restoration zone (CRES and VNU, 2015). The overall management of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve was the responsibility of the FPD under MARD management. The land use was defined as a ‘Special Use Forest’<sup>20)</sup>. The main purpose of its establishment was to conserve the typical forest biodiversity of North Central Vietnam. It also conserved precious and endangered species. The final purpose of the Reserve was the protection of the watershed forests of the Ma and Luong Rivers which are two important rivers in the Thanh Hoa Province (CBB, 2008).

All people who lived inside the boundary of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve had to move to a new location. As a result, the Cha Lat hamlet was also forcibly resettled to a new location assigned by the government. Local authorities named the new resettlement site the Suoi Ton hamlet. The hamlet has a buffered zone with the Pu Hu nature reserve. This hamlet is located at altitudes ranging from 400 to 600 meters above sea level. It is bound in the north by the Tai Giac hamlet, in the west by the Khoa hamlet and in the east and south by the Pu Hu Nature Reserve (Figure 8). The total land of this new resettlement is approximately 300 hectares, of which roughly 200 hectares is forest land. Compared to the Cha Lat hamlet, the new resettlement has relatively good infrastructure. The road is accessible by motorcycle and four-wheel drive vehicles from the central commune to this hamlet. The government has built convenient facilities such as electricity, a kindergarten, and a primary school. The Suoi Ton hamlet consisted of 65 households with 385 people from four main clans. In the new resettlement area, the villagers freely selected locations for building their houses. Four clans, resided at separate locations near small streams scattered around four areas. As a result, the households of the same clans were close to each other, similar to what they experienced in the Cha Lat hamlet.

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<sup>20)</sup> ‘Special Use Forest’ has been established to maintain ecosystems, to conserve biodiversity, to provide opportunities for scientific research, to protect cultural and historical sites and for outdoor recreation and ecotourism. ‘Special Use Forest’ includes national parks, nature reserve, landscape protection areas, and scientific research and experiment forests.

Local livelihoods are principally based on agricultural activities. The most prominent crops are dry rice, wet rice, maize, cassava and bamboo. Raising livestock, particularly cattle, buffalo, chicken, and pigs, plays a role in the household economy. Extra cash comes from cutting bamboo shoots, banana leaves, and so on.



**Figure 8. Locations of research hamlets and Pu Hu Nature Reserve**

(Source: field survey in 2017)

**5.4. The social-economic and political Hmong community in the Cha Lat hamlet before establishment Nature Reserve**

The Hmong, who lived in the Cha Lat hamlet, are one of 54 official ethnic minorities in Vietnam. This ethnic minority group ranks as the fifth largest group with 1,068,189 people, equivalent to 1.24% of Vietnam’s population in 2009 (GSOV, 2010). Historically, the Hmong people migrated from Southern China to North Vietnam at the end of the eighteenth century due to turmoil with Chinese feudal lords. The majority of the Hmong people (over 91%) are settled in the northern mountainous regions of Vietnam. The remainder primarily live in Thanh Hoa (1.4%), Nghe An province (2.7%) in the Central region and Dak Lak (2.1%), Dak Nong province (2%) in the Central Highlands (GSOV, 2010). They often settle in the rugged uplands, 800-1500m above the sea level, where they have traditionally practiced shifting cultivation.

In Cha Lat, all land and natural resources surrounding a community were defined as communal property. The land belonged to the community, but cultivation and cropping were done

by individual households<sup>21)</sup>. They claimed land based on the norm of subsistence to meet their day-to-day requirements for ‘safety first’. As a result, the differences in landholding per person among households were fairly minimal. According to the survey data from fourteen households, the average landholdings per household and per person were about 2.8 hectares and 0.5 hectares, respectively. Among the households interviewed, the largest landholding per household was 6 hectares, while the smallest was 0.5 hectares (Table 14). Furthermore, the households who had a small amount of land could make up their livelihoods from other activities such as raising livestock or collecting non-timber forest products (NTFPs).

**Table 14. Landholding and livelihoods of households interviewed before resettlement (1998)**

No	Hometown	Age	Family member (person)	Year of migration	Land holding 1998 (ha)	Landholding /person (ha)	Crops (*)	Livelihoods (**)
1	Yen Bai	47	4	1996	3	0.8	1, 2	1, 2, 3
2	Yen Bai	38	2	1998	0.7	0.4	1	1
3	Yen Bai	39	7	1996	1.5	0.2	1, 2, 3	1, 2, 3
4	Yen Bai	49	5	1993	3.8	0.8	1, 3	1, 2
5	Yen Bai	54	9	1996	4	0.4	1, 3	1
6	Yen Bai	70	4	1994	4	1.0	1	1, 2
7	Son La	86	6	1993	4	0.7	1	1
8	Son La	68	6	1992	2	0.3	1, 3, 4	1, 2
9	Yen Bai	65	7	1996	1	0.1	1, 3	1, 2, 3
10	Yen Bai	44	4	1996	4	1.0	1	1
11	Yen Bai	65	7	1996	0.5	0.1	1	1
12	Yen Bai	47	5	1996	1	0.2	1	1
13	Yen Bai	53	6	1997	4	0.7	1	1
14	Yen Bai	40	8	1993	6	0.8	1, 3	1, 3
<b>Avg.</b>					<b>2.8</b>	<b>0.5</b>		

Note: (\*) 1. Dry rice 2. Sticky rice 3. Cassava 4. Maize

(\*\*) 1. Agricultural 2. Livestock 3. NTFPs

(Source: field survey in 2017)

<sup>21)</sup> Key informant interview with the communist party leader who was a former village head, 18<sup>th</sup> November 2015.

According to the results of the household survey, villagers used forest areas for livelihood activities related to agriculture, livestock and NTFPs, which primarily met family consumption needs. For agricultural activities, the villagers planted dry rice, cassava, maize and sticky rice in swidden land. One hundred percent of respondents planted dry rice as the main source of their daily subsistence. The dry rice was planted for 2-3 crop cycles, then the land was left fallow. Dry rice had a yield which ranged from 2000 to 3300 kg/ha<sup>22)</sup>. Aside from dry rice, the Hmong used this land for planting cassava, maize, and sticky rice. There were six households, among a total of 14, who planed cassava, which was then used as a source of food for livestock. Meanwhile, few households (14%) benefited from selling sticky rice to earn extra money. Villagers usually sold sticky rice to other ethnic minorities such as the Muong. Prices ranged from 700-1,500 VND/kg (0.03-0.07 USD)<sup>23)</sup>. The raising and care of livestock constituted their other farming activity. Villagers mainly raised chicken, pigs, and cows around their homes, without fences. Products from the forest were extra sources of livelihood for villagers. From November to December, the villagers went to the forest to hunt the wild animals. This was their source of daily food. Villagers also collected timber as a source of fuel and built their houses in the forest<sup>24)</sup>. Because cultivated land was well fertilized, all crops prospered. Livestock developed without epidemic diseases<sup>25)</sup>. A 47-year-old's household interview described life in Cha Lat before state intervention: "In Cha Lat, my family had three ha in three plots. The land was abundant with a high yield. Dry rice had yielded about 2,700 kg/ha. The production is enough food during two years. Therefore, my family always had enough food for daily subsistence" (Household interviewees, February 2017).

According to the results of key informant interviews<sup>26)</sup>, in Cha Lat, all activities of the community were under the leadership of the village head and clan head. Households of the same clan usually live in one or close clusters to support each other. Labor exchange is the traditional way that villagers used to help each other in farming. People mainly help others within their clans first and then help their neighbors. They clear fields, plant rice, weed, and harvest from the field to home. Each time a family receives help from someone, they return that help within the same planting season. However, in the special case of widows, the ill, or houses which lack laborers, they are not required to return the help they receive, as labor is given as mutual support from the

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<sup>22)</sup> The information gathered from five household interviewees: No.1, 24<sup>th</sup> February 2017; No.3, 25<sup>th</sup> February 2017; No.4, 25<sup>th</sup> February 2017; No.8, 27<sup>th</sup> February 2017 and No. 12, 1<sup>st</sup> March 2017.

<sup>23)</sup> In March 2018, 1 USD is approximately 22,725 VND.

<sup>24)</sup> A 47-year-old's household interview (No.1), 24<sup>th</sup> February 2017.

<sup>25)</sup> A 54-year-old's household interview (No.5), 26<sup>th</sup> February 2017.

<sup>26)</sup> Information of local governance system and social relationship in Cha Lat hamlet collected from key informant interview of clan head of Vang (Yen Bai), Mua (Son La), 25<sup>th</sup> February 2017 and 26<sup>th</sup> February 2017 respectively.

community. The other activities of mutual support in this community include building houses. If anyone is endeavoring to build a house, the other members of the village could assist in making walls, roofing, or supporting with material from the forest by felling timber. Providing assistance to each other is a part of everyday life for Hmong people. The community has rules that govern the way they may assist each other in daily life when one or some households face difficulties. Particularly, in the case of funerals, each household assists the grieving family with a faggot of firewood, some maize corn, or bottles of wine, provided during the funeral. Alternatively, in the Mua clan, households gave 10 kg of dry rice to households with illness. Furthermore, the local people used their bonded relationship to help newcomers to reclaim their lands as a gesture of mutual assistance. Additionally, within a clan, families assist each other in their daily lives. As noted by a 70-year-old<sup>27)</sup>, his family moved to this hamlet in 1994. As he was a newcomer, it was very hard for his family to cultivate the land, which was located far from his house. Therefore, his brother-in-law helps his family by lending two hectares of land. In addition, participation in communal events not only maintains community spirit and solidarity, but also creates comfortable opportunities for people to share ideas and knit social relations with their fellow villagers.

### 5.5. Implementing the resettlement program

In 1998, the displacement program for establishment of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve was implemented. In total, this program displaced 3,026 Hmong people (500 households) in eight hamlets which belong to the two districts of Quan Hoa and Muong Lat (Table 15). The Hmong in Cha Lat were included in the government's relocation program. They were forced to move out from their homes located in the area occupied by the Pu Hu Nature Reserve.

**Table 15. The number of displaced Hmong people in the Pu Hu Nature Reserve**

<b>Hamlet</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Household</b>	<b>People</b>
Suoi Ha	Trung Ly commune, Muong Lat district	15	92
Pum	Trung Ly commune, Muong Lat district	89	537
Vanh	Trung Ly commune, Muong Lat district	79	476
Kep	Trung Ly commune, Muong Lat district	79	482
Na Y	Trung Ly commune, Muong Lat district	70	426
Co Luong	Trung Ly, commune Muong Lat district	36	219
Dang	Trung Thanh commune, Quan Hoa district	23	142
Cha Lat	Phu Son commune, Quan Hoa district	109	652
<b>Total</b>		<b>500</b>	<b>3026</b>

(Source: Report of the resettlement program, the Pu Hu Nature Reserve, 2000)

<sup>27)</sup> Information collected from household interview of No.4, 25<sup>th</sup> February 2017.

In Cha Lat hamlet, forced resettlements from the Pu Hu Nature Reserve have been implemented from April 1998 to January 1999<sup>28</sup>). This was divided into three main periods: (1) the announcement and propaganda related to resettlement (April-July 1998); (2) the selection of the relocation area and compensation for host communities (August-December 1998); (3) the move to the new relocation area (January 1999- March 2000). The Forest Protection Department of Quan Hoa district and the Pu Hu Management Board were responsible for the whole process. The first period mainly related to the announcement of the resettlement program, which took place during a village meeting. Acquiring the community's agreement to the displacement at the first village meeting was not easy. There was inconsistency regarding the displacement between local villagers and the government. The community refused to move from their lands, meanwhile, the government used strong pressure to force community displacement. The village leader admitted that there was no way to refuse the government's decision. Although the community did not have enough power to avoid their displacement, some households still tried to delay leaving to have time to harvest their crops. The plan was to move all villagers out of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve by the end January 1999; however, until November 1999, twenty-one households out of 109 still lived in the Cha Lat hamlet. This resulted in the forced displacement of eight hamlets, and the Cha Lat hamlet was finally completely moved to a new resettlement site in March 2000 after the authority agencies burnt all houses of those who had delayed their departure. As noted by one witness from the twenty-one households, "It was a bad memory. They threw away my assets and burnt up my house. They shouted angrily and strongly forced us moved out from Cha Lat" (Key informant interview, November 2015 and February 2017).

The government assigned the resettlement site without consultation with local villagers. The resettlement site is located in a swidden field and bamboo groves of the host community. One community is the Muong ethnic group, who lived in the Khoa hamlet, and the other is the Thai ethnic group, who lived in the Tai Giac hamlet (Figure 9). Before resettlement, two host communities have cultivated paddy fields close to their residential areas for subsistence, while in swidden land relatively far from the residential areas, cassava and maize were planted for raising livestock<sup>29</sup>). The bamboo trees, planted in large areas scattered near four small streams, is the primary source of household cash income. In total, the land of both Khoa and Tai Giac hamlets before 1998 totaled 494 hectares and 300 hectares, respectively. To set up the new resettlement area, the government suggested that each of the host communities should share 150 hectares of

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<sup>28</sup>) The information of implementing the resettlement program was collected from a key informant interview with staff of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve on 27<sup>th</sup> November 2015; the official in charge of land management in the commune on 17<sup>th</sup> November 2015, former village head on 26<sup>th</sup> February, 2017, and members of a household which delayed moving to the new resettlement on 21<sup>th</sup> November 2015 and 23<sup>th</sup> February 2017.


<sup>29</sup>) Key informant interview with village head of Khoa hamlet, Mr Ha Van Pet, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2015.

land. Due to the small land area, however, the Thai people in the Tai Giac hamlet only agreed to share 100 hectares of land with the new settler. Meanwhile the Muong people shared 200 hectares of land with the new settlers<sup>30</sup>). The village head of Muong hamlet explained the reason for sharing land “At the first time, our community did not make all consensus among households. However, we should share the land for help Hmong people who was affected by the Pu Hu Nature Reserve establishment. Their situation was more difficulty than us. All of their lands in Cha Lat hamlet lost, while we still have rice paddies and bamboo lands even if we share land to them” (Key informant interview, June 2015). This explanation from the village head of the Muong hamlet clearly indicates a norm of reciprocity functions, even in inter-ethnic relationships, though the shared lands with the Hmong were not the main sources for either the Muong or the Thai, whose main livelihoods are dependent on paddy fields, not swidden land. Despite the risk of a future land shortage for Thai and Muong peoples and although the extent of sharing Moral Economy with other ethnic group was different for the Muong and the Thai, they felt that they had a moral duty to help the Hmong people due to the displacement process. It is worth noting that besides the small land holding of the Thai hamlet, the Muong share a very similar cultural background with the Hmong and had experiences with the Hmong in Cha Lat through the trade of sticky rice. Actually, there has not been a single land dispute among these three ethnic groups after resettlement<sup>31</sup>), which demonstrates the inter-ethnic sharing of the Moral Economy and is not merely the result of passive responses to the state intervention.

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<sup>30</sup>) Key informant interview with village head of Khoa hamlet 15<sup>th</sup> June 2015, village head of Suoi Ton hamlet on 13<sup>th</sup> June 2015 and the official in charge of land management in commune on 17<sup>th</sup> November 2015.

<sup>31</sup>) The data source is same with 30).



(a) Before land sharing (b) After land sharing

**Figure 9. Hamlet boundaries, land use before and after land sharing**

(Source: field survey in 2017)

After receiving 300 hectares of land consisting of both swidden fields and bamboo groves from the host communities, the swidden land inside the Suoi Ton hamlet was openly accessible to all households, who could claim as much land as they needed for cultivation based on customary laws. The results of the household survey revealed that, as of 2004, the average size of landholding per household and per person in Suoi Ton was 1.8 hectares and 0.3 hectares, respectively (Table 16). To make up the decreased land holdings in the resettled area, besides reclaiming the swidden land inside the Suoi Ton territory, the villagers encroached on the land for swidden inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve until 2004. After the establishment of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve, in theory, all human activities have not been allowed inside the reserve. In reality, however, between 1999 and 2003, many Hmong people claimed the land inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve as they did before resettlement. Among fourteen households, eight households (57%) practiced shifting cultivation inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve during this period of time.

**Table 16. Landholding per household (hh) and per person before resettlement (1998) and after resettlement (2004)**

No	Landholding 1998 (ha)		Family member 2005* (person)	Landholding/hh 2004 (ha)			Landholding/person 2004 (ha)			Changed land 1998-2004 (ha)	
	per house-hold	per person		Total	Pu Hu	Suoi Ton	Total	Pu Hu	Suoi Ton	Land-holding/hh	Land-holding/person
1	3	0.8	6	2.5	2.0	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.1	-0.5	-0.3
2	0.7	0.4	4	3.0	0.0	3.0	0.8	0.0	0.8	2.3	0.4
3	1.5	0.2	7	2.2	1.0	1.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.1
4	3.8	0.8	7	4.8	0.0	4.8	0.7	0.0	0.7	1.0	-0.1
5	4	0.4	9	3.0	1.0	2.0	0.3	0.1	0.2	-1.0	-0.1
6	4	1.0	6	4.0	0.0	4.0	0.7	0.0	0.7	0.0	-0.3
7	4	0.7	6	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	-2.0	-0.3
8	2	0.3	6	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0
9	1	0.1	7	4.0	2.0	2.0	0.6	0.3	0.3	3.0	0.4
10	4	1.0	4	1.5	0.0	1.5	0.4	0.0	0.4	-2.5	-0.6
11	0.5	0.1	7	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
12	1	0.2	5	1.5	1.5	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.1
13	4	0.7	6	3.0	0.0	3.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	-1.0	-0.2
14	6	0.8	10	3.0	3.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.0	-3.0	-0.5
<b>Avg.</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>-0.2</b>	<b>-0.1</b>

(Source: field survey in 2017)

\* The authors collected the data of family members as of 2005.

In 2004, the average of landholdings per household was slightly decreased by 0.2 hectares over 6 years, from 2.8 hectares in 1998 to 2.6 hectares in 2004. Likewise, there was a slight decrease in landholding per person from 0.5 hectares before resettlement (1998) to 0.4 hectares after resettlement (2004). However, the eight households (57%) could keep the same or more landholdings than before the resettlement (Table 17). Some of them could expand their lands through reclamation of the land inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve.

In short, until 2004, the villagers had kept their customary land tenure even after resettlement. It is worth noting that the inter-ethnic relationship based on the common 'subsistence ethic' played a crucial role in mitigating state intervention.

**Table 17. Comparison landholding before resettlement (1998) and after resettlement (2004)**

<b>Landholding in 2004</b>	<b>Number of households (%)</b>
Less than before resettlement	6 (42.9)
Same as before resettlement	3 (21.4)
More than before resettlement	5 (35.7)

(Source: field survey in 2017)

### **5.6. State intervention in the new settlement and the Hmong response**

After resettlement, the socio-economic and political life of the Hmong community was challenged by state interventions. The two primary state interventions are highlighted in this section, *i.e.* limited access inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve and Forest Land Allocation (Table 18).

**Table 18. Timeline of state interventions in the Suoi Ton hamlet**

<b>Year</b>	<b>State interventions</b>
<b>1998</b>	<b>Resettlement program for the Pu Hu Nature Reserve establishment</b> The Hmong were forcibly moved from the Cha Lat hamlet to the Suoi Ton hamlet
<b>2004</b>	<b>Limited access inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve</b> The Hmong were prohibited from access to natural resources inside the Pu Hu nature reserve
<b>2005</b>	<b>FLA</b> Individual households were allocated land based on the statutory land rights systems

(Source: field survey in 2017)

#### **a. Limited access inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve and the redistribution of land among villagers**

In 2004, the government began strictly controlling local people's activities inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve. The authority of the Pu Hu Nature Reserve established seven checkpoints with 15 rangers to prevent the encroachment of local people. Every week, they patrolled 2-3 times to discover illegal activities. Nature reserve authorities do not allow swidden or other activities which exploit natural resources and the ecological system. Additionally, the government clearly defined the boundary between the Nature Reserve and the Suoi Ton hamlet to prevent the encroachment of villagers. Apart from swidden cultivation activities, the Hmong people cannot cut timber for house construction, collecting NTFPs for their daily food. The Nature Reserve authorities carried out many propaganda campaigns to newly legitimize the reserve. Also, they punished encroachers

who illegally cut down trees. Many households who logged timber for house construction were fined<sup>32</sup>). Besides the ban on logging, hunting wild animals for food was also prohibited. Many guns which were used for hunting animals in the Pu Hu nature reserve were confiscated by rangers. Consequently, NTFPs, one of the traditional livelihood activities of villagers, was gradually restricted. The villagers could no longer freely access natural resources as they did before. The limitation on access to natural resources inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve in 2004 caused the loss of land. Fourteen household interviewees revealed that there were eight households (57%) who had lost land in the Pu Hu Nature Reserve. The total land lost was 12.5 hectares (Table 19). The largest piece of land was three hectares, and the smallest one was one hectare. Land scarcity became a serious challenge for their livelihood.

To cope with these problems, the village community devised a solution—sharing land among villagers. Accordingly, the village head and the clan heads mobilised landed households to share their land to help households with less land overcome this hardship. Also, mutual assistance within the community is popular in this community. First, the donors enthusiastically registered the plots of land that they were willing to share with landless households. Areas of land, as well as land locations, were decided by the donors. Second, the households with less land applied for assistance with their situation to the village community. Mainly, they were landless due to the land they lost inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve. Alternatively, even though they did not lose land, their land was inadequate for sustaining the demand of daily subsistence activities required to raise a larger family. For instance, Table 19 illustrates that household No. 11 received 0.5 hectares of land from his relative in the Vang clan despite the fact that he had not lost land inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve. Subsequently, the village head and the leader of clans selected donors and recipients. Priority was given to the recipient who was the closest kin to the donor. The result of our household interviews indicated that seven households of donors and recipients were in the same clan (Table 19). Leaders then chose donors and recipients from different clans. Finally, after all these steps, the village head and leader of the clans, accompanied by donors and recipients, chose new boundaries of land to avoid disputes.

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<sup>32</sup>) The household interviewee said ‘I used the timber for house construction and was fined 6-7 million VND (264-308 USD)’.

**Table 19. The land share among households in the Suoi Ton hamlet**

No	Landholding 2004 (ha)	Lost land (ha)	Received land (ha)	Shared land (ha)	Relationships of donors and recipients	Landholding 2005 (ha)
1	2.5	2	1	0	Same clan	1.5
2	3.0	0	0	1	Same clan	2
3	2.2	1	0	0		1.2
4	4.8	0	0	0		4.8
5	3.0	1	0	0		2
6	4.0	0	0	0		4
7	2.0	1	0.5	0	Same clan	1.5
8	2.0	1	0	0		1
9	4.0	2	0.5	0	Same clan	2.5
10	1.5	0	0	0		1.5
11	0.5	0	0.5	0	Same clan	1
12	1.5	1.5	0.3	0	Same clan	0.3
13	3.0	0	0	0		3
14	3.0	3	1	0	Same clan	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>27.3</b>

(Source: field survey in 2017)

The reduction in the average of both landholdings per household and per person was caused by state intervention. After land sharing measures were implemented by the villages, there was a slight decrease in land holdings. The average acreage per household decreased from 2.6 hectares in 2004 to 2 hectares in 2005. Likewise, compared to 2004, the average landholding per person steadily decreased by 0.1 hectare in 2005 (Table 20). Although the Hmong community has been faced with land scarcity, they still maintain their mutual support, assisting other households as they did before. Even if this assistance would not offset lost land, some villagers could not overcome the land shortage for their subsistence needs. For instance, household No.1 received help from his brother who shared one ha of land. Due to this help, members of his family could overcome their food shortage. Some households, however, such as No. 3, 5, and 8, who lost land inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve, did not take the opportunity to receive help from the community. They seemed to consider other households, who were more impoverished than their own households. For instance,

the key informant interviewee who lost one ha of land inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve and did not receive land from other households explained his position: “Although my family lost 1 hectare of land inside Pu Hu Nature Reserve, we still have two plots of land, roughly 1.2 hectares that we fallowed since 2001. Though our situation is better than others who both lost the land inside Pu Hu Nature Reserve and were landless in the Suoi Ton hamlet. These landless households more urgently need the help than my family. Therefore, I did not register to the community for receiving land” (Household interviewee of 39-years- old, February 2017).

**Table 20. Changes of landholding per household and landholding per person in 1998, 2004 and 2005**

No	1998			2004			2005		
	Family member (person)	Land-holding (ha)	Land-holding /person (ha)	Family member* (person)	Land-holding (ha)	Land-holding/ person (ha)	Family member (person)	Land-holding (ha)	Land-holding/ person (ha)
1	4	3	0.8	6	2.5	0.4	6	1.5	0.3
2	2	0.7	0.4	4	3.0	0.8	4	2	0.5
3	7	1.5	0.2	7	2.2	0.3	7	1.2	0.2
4	5	3.8	0.8	7	4.8	0.7	7	4.8	0.7
5	9	4	0.4	9	3.0	0.3	9	2	0.2
6	4	4	1.0	6	4.0	0.7	6	4	0.7
7	6	4	0.7	6	2.0	0.3	6	1.5	0.3
8	6	2	0.3	6	2.0	0.3	6	1	0.2
9	7	1	0.1	7	4.0	0.6	7	2.5	0.4
10	4	4	1.0	4	1.5	0.4	4	1.5	0.4
11	7	0.5	0.1	7	0.5	0.1	7	1	0.1
12	5	1	0.2	5	1.5	0.3	5	0.3	0.1
13	6	4	0.7	6	3.0	0.5	6	3	0.5
14	8	6	0.8	10	3.0	0.3	10	1	0.1
<b>Avg.</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>0.3</b>

(Source: field survey in 2017)

\* The numbers of family member in 2004 was assumed to be the same as in 2005 due to lack of data in 2004.

**b. The implementation of forest land allocation and local community negotiation between customary law and statutory law**

In Vietnam, more than 9 million hectares of state forest land were allocated to individual households, communities, and economic entities beginning in the 1990s. At the same time, the government has urged local people to become involved in protecting forests and developing plantations as well. In Thanh Hoa Province, where forest land accounts for 63% of the natural land area, the government implemented forest land allocation since 1995. The FLA in Suoi Ton hamlet was implemented 10 years later than the other parts of the province. In 2005, the local government implemented FLA in the Suoi Ton hamlet and followed the guidelines of *Decree No.02/CP* on FLA for organisations, individuals, and households. The local authorities decided to allocate forest land of approximately 100-120 hectares in 300 hectares of the Suoi Ton hamlet that was formerly used for swidden cultivation to over 64 households of Hmong people. The duration of a longer-term lease is fifty years. The government believed that the forest land allocation to individual households helped to ensure the tenure of households. The Quan Hoa Forest Protection Department and official in charge of land management in the Phu Son commune took the main responsibility for land allocation to individual households. They expected the land distribution to be equal. Individual households received the land by lottery. The average amount of land allocation per household was 1.5 hectares.

However, the implementation of this reallocation was inconsistent for the local community. The community did not follow the forest land allocation of the local authorities and refused to participate in the process of distributing plots. The villagers resisted the long-term allocation of forest land because they did not want to break the ‘harmony’ in the relationship of both their kinship within the clan and with other clans. After a long discussion between local and authorities, the forest land allocation was implemented as a form of compromise between customary law and statutory law. The distribution of land among villagers was accepted by the local community based on customary law, while the land certificate issued by government officers was based on statutory law. First, households declared their land plots, in which the household had a traditional claim of ‘first come first served’. Then, households pointed out the location of land to the Village Management Board in which the village head and clan heads were representatives. Before the Village Management Board documented the acres of the plots without measurement, they confirmed whether there was a dispute on plots to prevent land disputes after allocation. Finally, the government officer received the results of forest land allocation from the local community. They then issued the Land Use Right Certification to each household.

In summary, following resettlement in Suoi Ton Hamlet, the two events above clearly represent how the intra-ethnic relationship functions to mitigate the impacts of the state intervention within the scope of the Moral Economy. The intra-ethnic redistribution of land within Hmong communities provided a safety net for villagers in times of resource scarcity.

## **5.7. Discussion and Conclusion**

This study began with the aim of assessing the dynamics of Hmong people's responses to state intervention and determining how the Hmong in the Suoi Ton hamlet have responded to the intervention. As Scott (1976) noted, the most important principle of Southeast Asian peasants is based on norms of reciprocity and the 'right to subsistence'. All members of the community have a right to a minimum level of subsistence, and the community must support this right. They have a moral duty to help one another. They prefer to maintain 'safety first' for survival, rather than take risks to maximize their income (Scott, 1976). Political mobilization occurs when there is widespread belief that elites or government are ignoring the duties of the subsistence ethic (Scott, 1976). Sowerwine (2004) depicted two Dao communities in the uplands of Vietnam who successfully negotiated the replacement of forest reforms by using local power relations, local specific ecological conditions and customary practices. In another case of Black Thai people in Thai Nguyen Province, bonds of kinship among local villagers help them successfully acquire their ancestral lands from Kinh immigrants<sup>33)</sup> since decollectivisation (Scott, 2000). Furthermore, previous studies on the Hmong in Northern Vietnam argued that the individual households successfully responded to market forces by using selective livelihood diversification which was based on their needs, culture systems, and ethnicity (Tugault-Lafleur and Turner, 2011; Tuner and Michaud, 2009). The Hmong people in our study area corroborate with the previous results of Hmong studies about intra-ethnic relations through sharing the bonds of kinship and ethnicity. On the other hand, however, the evidence from this case study provides additional insights into the school of Moral Economy, arguing that inter-ethnic relations can encourage an intra-ethnic dynamic to mitigate the state intervention.

Before the state intervention, the Hmong people had been regularly meeting their day-to-day requirements for survival by using natural resources shared in common. Strict management rules and customary laws were established to provide access to resources in an egalitarian and sustainable way. Also, the traditional governance system consisting of rights and regulations,

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<sup>33)</sup> Kinh is the majority ethnic group in Vietnam accounting for 85.7% of the total population in the 2009 census (GSOV, 2010). Since the 1960s, the large number of immigrant Kinh people in lowland of Red River Delta moved to Thai Nguyen Province under the New Economic Zones program.

maintained social cohesion, village kinship, and risk sharing obligations within a community. The limitation of access inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve has largely reduced and eliminated their ability to meet their basic subsistence needs. Most villagers have found themselves living under great pressure from resource scarcity. In the resettled hamlet, the Hmong did not have enough cultivable land to feed their families. They could not collect products from the forest. Our results revealed that the Hmong people responded to the state intervention by sustaining the local rights of subsistence and the normative values of traditions in the Hmong community. The redistribution of land intra-ethnically within Hmong communities functioned to mitigate risk, based on norms of reciprocity and subsistence. This also provided safety nets for villagers in times of resource scarcity. Furthermore, Muong and Thai peoples shared land with Hmong peoples in their resettlement. This indicated a norm of reciprocity in inter-ethnic relationships. Despite the risk of future land shortage for Thai and Muong peoples, they felt they had a moral duty to help Hmong people due to the displacement process. As a result of inter and intra-ethnic reciprocity, the moral economy still existed in this community. Customary elements, based on kinship, mutual assistance, and communal ownership, played an important role for Hmong people in Cha Lat, in particular, as well as for general ethnic minorities in the Vietnam uplands. However, the implementation of state intervention has not closely considered the existence of customary elements and local interests.

These findings may assist the state in rethinking its interventions, which have been constructed with very little respect for the differences and desires of ethnic peoples. Furthermore, the main findings, that not only the intra-ethnic relationship but also the inter-ethnic relationship among ethnic minorities can play an important role to maintain the Moral Economy, are expected to deepen the previous understanding on the Moral Economy, which has previously constrained its scope to the study of the intra-ethnic relationship alone.

## CHAPTER 6

### SEDENTARIZATION PROGRAM AND EVERYDAY RESISTANCE TO BEYOND STATE INTERVENTION

#### 6.1. Introduction

Nomadic lifestyle and sedentarization one are two common livelihoods of agricultural inhabitants all over the world. The former normally takes existence in the communities of the people cultivating in upland areas throughout Asia (Keyes, 2002). In the course of more than half of this century, governments throughout Asia are speeding up the fixed cultivation and sedentarization programme for nomadic groups of the population. The changing process from shifting cultivation and nomadic living to settled one has been a major concern in the development policy of most countries where nomadic people live (Fox *et al.*, 2009). The success of sedentarization programme depends mainly on the state's policies and the implementation of these policies. The programs of the sedentarization that governments have carried have brought about significant changes in the social life of shifting cultivators, including both risks and challenges.

Similar to those of many Asian countries, mountainous areas of Vietnam have been facing quite severe socio-economic and environmental challenges. Most of ethnic minorities living the upland of Vietnam have practiced shifting cultivation in a wide range of levels (Rambo and Jamieson, 2003). Therefore, the sedentarization programme for shifting cultivation ethnic minorities is considered as an urgent requirement in the mountainous development strategy of not only Vietnam but also many countries around the world. Since the 1960s, the Government of Vietnam has implemented policies of the sedentarization programme for nomadic people that aims to reduce poverty in mountainous areas of Vietnam (Nguyen, 2008; Rambo and Jamieson, 2003)

Swidden agriculture and the implementation of the sedentarization program in Vietnam has attracted a great deal of attention of both domestic and foreign scholars. In which, the results of researches have shown that the sedentarization is regarded as the state's intervention on the nomadic groups through the policies and program of the national development. Researchers have all approved that mountainous development policies such as the sedentarization program are a pathway for the Vietnam government to assimilate ethnic minorities, demonstrating the function of the state to govern their territory, control their citizens, control the land, exploit natural resources, and ensure the national security as those in many other Asian countries (Keyes, 2002). The main similarity of the sedentarization implementation and development policies is that they are often imposed in accordance with the viewpoints of the State, of the majority population group in the country (Fox *et al.*, 2009; Keyes, 2002). Furthermore, the researches have shown that the viewpoints on the sedentarization programme of the State and those of the people are on the

opposition. The government has consistently argued that local ethnic minorities will have a better standard of living, better access to goods production and social services through infrastructure development, education, healthcare, higher agricultural productivity and modern technological and scientific applications. Meanwhile, the people have been restless when realizing that their new life has brought numerous difficulties, and they have encountered countless risks and instability when shifting to the settled life (McCaskill, 1997). Ha's research (1996) shows that the sedentarization program has misshapened the socio-economic status of the Dao people in Tan Dan commune, Quang Ninh province after the sedentarization program were implemented there. Likewise, the study on the sedentarization of Nguyen (2008) analyzed the consequences of these programs on the culture and society of the Kho mu ethnic minority group. In addition, the fact that a great deal of emphasis was placed on eliminating outdated practices and backwardness has led most of the State's sedentarization projects to failure. According to Keyes (2002), efforts to force ethnic minorities to abandon their traditional shifting life, relocate them to non-traditional areas can gradually lead to conflicts between not only the people and the State but also the people in their own community. It can be seen that the sedentarization program has also resulted in lots of challenges, negative economic, cultural and social consequences on ethnic minority groups in the upland of Vietnam.

In his most significant works, Scott (1985) discusses a number of theories related to power, domination and resistance. He brings about a broad context for examining the process in which groups having less well-off socio-economic and cultural power refuse to give in to the dominance in labour exploitation. In his study, he emphasizes on pointing out the erroneous polarization between resistance and survival, and concentrates on the activities, relationships, and interactive dimensions of contentious political issues and conflicts correlated to the exploitation of farmers' labour. His arguments that the resistance of vulnerable social groups is worthy being considered and how the "weapons" that they use generate the power to reposition the dominant power but also the universality and high applicability of the terms "weapon of the weak" or "art of resistance". Therefore, this study aims at evaluating the implementation of the sedentarization program and its influences. At the same time, the study derives how Hmong people of Un hamlet practice everyday forms of resistance to avoid the state surveillance.

## **6.2. Methodology**

The author investigated the field survey at Hmong village, Muong Lat district, Thanh Hoa Province of North Central Vietnam. Our research is mainly based on key informant interviews and household questionnaire surveys. First, we conducted key informant interviews with the staff of Muong Lat FPD who take main responsibility for implementing the Forest Land Allocation implementation as well as for Sedentarization Program in Un hamlet. The focus of the interviews

was primarily to understand the Forest Land Allocation and Sedentarization Process. In the local level, the authors interviewed two former village heads, the village head, two people who are leaders of Christianity religion, and fourteen households. The purposes are to identify the village history, the lives of Hmong people before state intervention and local responses. Finally, fourteen households among the total of ninety-three, were randomly selected for the interviews. The semi-structured questionnaire mostly obtained to understand the local response to the Forest Land Allocation and Sedentarization Program. Data were collected in June, November 2015 and February 2017. Table 21 presents the characteristics of the household interviews.

**Table 21. Characteristics of household interviewed**


<b>Type</b>	<b>Persons</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
<b>Average age (43)</b>		
>65		
56–65	1	7
46–55	4	29
36–45	7	50
26–35	1	7
15–25	1	7
<b>Migration place</b>		
Yen Bai	1	7
Son La	9	64
Lao Cai	4	29
<b>Living experiences</b>		
Less than 20 years	3	21
More than 20 years	11	79
<b>Education</b>		
Illiterate	8	57
Primary school	5	36
Secondary school	1	7
<b>No. of household member</b>		
Less than 5	0	0
More than 5	14	100
<b>Religion</b>		
Christianity	14	100

(Source: field survey in 2017)

The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief description of the research site, the second part is discussing the process of two main state intervention in Un hamlet in accordance with the Forest Land Allocation and Sedentarization Program. In this section, we analyzed the ways of local resistance to go beyond the state surveillance. The discussion and conclusion are in the final section.

### 6.3. Outline of Hmong in Un hamlet

The Un hamlet lies at the North-western margin of Thanh Hoa province. Un hamlet belongs to Muong Ly commune of Muong Lat mountainous district, Thanh Hoa province (Figure 10). It was border line with Son La Province. The hamlet has 93 households with the total population of 609 persons of Hmong, one of the largest ethnic minority groups in Muong Ly commune. They live in a total area of approximately 400 hectares spreading out over a mountainous area of the elevation of between 650 to 700 meters above sea level with the high slope ranging from 25<sup>0</sup> to 30<sup>0</sup>. This hamlet has isolated location, which is about 300 km far from the central city of Thanh Hoa province. The hamlet has relatively difficult infrastructural condition; therefore it is extremely hard to be accessed, especially during the rainy season. Even though the distance from centre of Muong Lat district to Un hamlet is only approximately 30 km, today it still takes more than three hours to get to the hamlet through a tiny and rough road by motor bike and water ways. However, it is easier to access the hamlet from the Son La Province, which takes only about 30-45 minutes by motorbike.



**Figure 10. Location of research site**

The people of this hamlet originally lived in provinces of Son La, Lao Cai and Yen Bai in North Vietnam Uplands (Figure 10). The group in Son La Province is Black Hmong, meanwhile the group in Lao Cai Province is Flower Hmong and the group in Yen Bai Province is White Hmong.

Three groups migrated to this hamlet at different times of period 1991 to 2001. The first lineage of 12 households in Vang clan in Yen Bai group settled down in Un hamlet in 1991. Meanwhile, the group of Lao Cai consisting of four clans of Ho, Mua, Giang, Sung moved to Un hamlet in the period of 1992-1996. The Phang, Hang, Lo, Thao, Ly and Sung clan in Son La group migrated to the Un hamlet between 1993 and 2001. It is worth noticing that in 1994 the government tried to evict these three groups back to their homeland; however the government did not success. After eviction, the three groups not only returned Un hamlet but also let the other families/clans in their hometown. For example, the first Ho clan in Lao Cai group moved to this hamlet in 1992. Later, the Mua clan in Lao Cai group knew about Un hamlet through Ho clan, then they migrated to the hamlet in 1995.

The reasons for migration are also different among three groups. In the Yen Bai group, the exhausted land for shifting cultivation led to the clan head's decision of moving to another area with abundant natural resources. In contrast to the Yen Bai group, for the Lao Cai group, whose land was still fertile and abundant for cultivation, the reason of their migration is to avoid the ban on Christianity religion by the government. Meanwhile, that the government banned the plantation of traditional medicine of Hmong as well as the Christianity religion in 1992 led the Son La group to migrate to Un hamlet, where geographical settings are suitable for them.

Since 1997, when the government was officially established under the name of Un hamlet, the government began to invest in the construction of infrastructure in the village. In 2006, the road was built in which 2km of asphalt road was laid in the centre of the village. There were a primary school and kindergarten in the village, and a communal home since 2008. However, the community home is not used by the people, so since 2011 the home has been used as a residence for Thai teachers, Kinh people teach at primary and pre-school. At the same time, people built their own community living areas and religious activities regularly every Sunday morning for Lao Cai and Son La groups.

In 2009, the government implemented the sedentarization program to settle down households from the watershed forest to the sedentary settlement area. Administrative, the village consists of two separate residences of Son La and Lao Cai, far away about 3 km. Along the two sides of the road, stretching across the hills, around the homes of the residents here is the upland fields alternating with rice, maize.

#### 6.4. The socio-political and economic of Un hamlet before state intervention

When they moved to Un hamlet, the groups of Lao Cai, Yen Bai and Son La were divided into three separate areas, each group of households living together on the basis of the family line, the religious beliefs or the previous nearby location where they used to live next to each other. The residential areas of the three groups of households are in the watershed protection forest, bordered Thanh Hoa and Son La provinces. This is an area with rich natural forests, topography and climate that are suitable for the traditional livelihood activities of the Hmong people.

In order to preserve subsistence economy, cultivating in burnt over - land is the main and the most vital economic practice of the people in Un hamlet. In this practice, the villagers cleared the slash-and-burn fields within the ownership of their community to grow two or three crops, depending on the fertility of the land. After that, they left the plots of the impoverished land for eight to ten years so that the soil was fertile again, then they returned to cultivate in those plots.

According to the results of the survey questionnaire of 14 households, in the period before 1998, each household had 1.7 ha, with a total area of 23.7 ha, in which, the largest household had 5 ha and the smallest one had 0.5 ha (Table 22). The main cultivation area of the households was in Son La and Un hamlet. In particular, each group of households from Lao Cai, Son La and Yen Bai had cultivation land areas separately marked for each group and each household in order to avoid land disputes. In the method of shifting cultivation, people carried out multiple cropping and intercropping on pieces of mountainous land. Rice was grown in the central part of the piece, the surrounding space was used to grow corn, vegetables, cassava and medicinal herbs. This model of multiple cropping and intercropping gave many products that would ensure self-sufficiency and secure the food supply for the family.

**Table 22. Landholding per household in 1998**

No	Place migration	Migration year	Landholding 1998 (ha)		
			Total	Un	Son La
1	Bac Yen district, Son La Province	1993	5	1	4
2	Moc Chau district, Son La Province	1995	1.3	1.3	0
3	Moc Chau district, Son La Province	1995	1	1	0
4	Bac Yen district, Son La Province	1996	2	1	1
5	Phu Yen district, Son La Province	1996	1.4	0.4	1
6	Moc Chau district, Son La Province	1996	2.5	1	1.5
7	Phu Yen district, Son La Province	1998	0.5	0	0.5
8	Yen Chau district, Son La Province	1999	0	0	0

9	Moc Chau district, Son La Province	2001	0	0	0
10	Muong Khuong district, Lao Cai Province	1992	1	1	0
11	Bac Ha district, Lao Cai Province	1995	2	2	0
12	Bac Ha district, Lao Cai Province	1995	2	2	0
13	Bac Ha district, Lao Cai Province	1996	1	1	0
14	Man Cong district, Yen Bai Province	1991	4	2	2
<b>Total</b>			<b>23.7</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Avg.</b>			<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.7</b>

(Source: field survey in 2017)

Additionally, hunting and harvesting forest products were also an important economic activity of the people in Un hamlet. Beside planting and hunting, the villagers also raised livestock and poultry that were used as both daily food and special dishes in cultural activities of worship, ceremonies or in cases of welcoming guests. Like in the Yen Bai group, buffaloes were the traditional sacrifices used in funerals or as spiritual healers for treating illness or diseases.

Besides, the people of Un hamlet practiced the upland swidden cultivation in a closed cycle or commonly known as fallow cultivation. According to customs, when a piece of land began to be infertile, people would abandon it for a certain period of time, depending on the natural conditions and population. Fallow period was based on the principle of not too long and not too short, because if the land was left fallow too long, the level of extensive cultivation would be too much, the field would be far from home, and if the fallow period was too short, the forest would not have enough time to grow again.

In the condition of rich soil and forests, the land rotation of the Hmong people in the three areas in Un hamlet was carried out over a period of 8-10 years. The old slash-and-burns, after fallow period for forests to regenerate and the soil to fertilize, would be used to grow crops in place of other degraded slabs. In addition to protecting upland fields from being impoverished, the villagers also set up regulations and customary rules to protect forests. As for the Yen Bai group, the head of the family clan stipulated the sacred forest of the group, with the area of about 2 hectares. This area of forest was used to worship and no one was allowed to cut down trees or cultivate. As for the Son La group, the watershed forest area was zoned to protect, reserve and maintain water supply for the whole clan.

In daily life, mutual assistance in production and in product distribution was a common practice of the people in Un hamlet. In cultivation activity, as well as in other production ones, the form of rotating and exchanging labours between not only the members who had the blood relationship but also those who had warm neighbourhood relations was popular within the group.

In the harvest season, some households gathered to finish the harvesting of one household, then to another one. This type of exchanging labours was practiced over the whole cycle of upland cultivation, from burning, tilling, and weeding to harvesting.

By rotating and exchanging labours, it ensured that all families were able to grow crops on the suitable time because rice and maize were the main crops for the Hmong people in Un hamlet. Apart from the equality of mutual support, the Hmong people in each of the three groups assisted each other in their daily lives. If there was a household in the group facing poor working conditions, the ones with better conditions would help without payment. This not only provided help among the households of the same clan but also extended within the whole community.

The mutual support was voluntary, not compulsory. As the Son La group who were Christians, to support difficult households and use in the activities of the group, they established a fund. The group fund was raised with the voluntary contributions of every individual, every household in the group, according to the 1/10 rule. The 1/10 rule meant that if a household harvested 10 bags of rice in the productive season, they would contribute to the fund one bag. The fund would be used as support to the families in need, as gifts for sick people, and in the community activities such as Christmas, Easter and New Year. In addition to help of labour, the share of cultivation land for the newly relocated households from long-standing households with large land was also a regular activity in the village. It can be seen that with the mutual support and assistance among families in each group, it ensured that all households in the community had enough food for survival. As a result, social relationships in the community were maintained and strengthened.

In summary, the livelihoods and social structure of the three Hmong groups in Un hamlet were basically characterized by an economy that was based on relationships (Moral Economy) with many agreements on culture, society and technology to ensure "Subsistence ethic" in which safety was above all. The people in Un hamlet tended to avoid resorting to behaviours that could create risks, especially to make their family's economic life fall below the acceptable point of a self-sufficient life.

## **6.5. The state-interventions and local response**

There were two main state intervention in Un hamlet that we focused on this sections. The first is Forest land allocation (1998) and the sedentarization program (2009).

### **a. Forest land allocation and local response**

Before the State carried out the allocation of forest land to individual households in 1998, beside the slash-and-burn fields in Un hamlet, households had also used cultivation land in the watershed protection forest of Son La province. In addition, to ensure self-sufficiency with enough food supply, the area of reclaimed land that was used as mountainous fields depended on the size

of the household. The bigger size the family was, the more reclaimed land they had. At the same time, multiple cropping and intercropping were the most popular methods of farming on their plots of land.

However, the process of forestland allocation to individual households conducted by Muong Lat Forest Protection Department in Un hamlet in 1998 was considered as a manner to crack the traditional land use process of the people and was a new approach of regulating the land use in accordance with regulations of the government. Consequently, when implementing the allocation of forestland, forest rangers did not take into account the reality, the current condition, the area of the slash-and-burn fields that people had used before; they only zoned the area of land allocation in the boundary of Un hamlet.

In addition, in the area of land designated by the community for cultivation, the households could clear the forests for cultivation land in the area where no other household used them. During the fallow, the cultivation land of the households became a grazing field for the whole community. The land in this period was also a place for the community to collect NTFPs, wild vegetables and some medicinal herbs. Beside the land that was used to cultivate by individual households, in Un hamlet there was also an area of the sacred, forbidden forest that was protected. That meant the limitation of land use rights in Son La area where many households of Un hamlet had cultivation land. Moreover, the land area that was allocated to each household was based on the average number of households, not per capita. Consequently, whether the household had more or fewer people, they were allocated the same area of land, about 2 ha for each household. Simultaneously, that they used the lucky draw to determine the location of land for each household led to disturbance of the land position of the households. In the past, their cultivation land and houses were often close to each other for conveniently cultivation, care and harvest. Now, through that way of allocating, the cultivation land and the houses of the households are far away from each other.

When allocating the land, the state did not pay attention to the customs and traditional rules in the people's protection of the community forest. Therefore, the area of the sacred and community forest was divided into small pieces by the district forest rangers and handed the land area to individual households., the scared forests, which under the traditional customs and rules used to be owned by the whole community, are now changed into cultivation land and divided into individual households. This led to the consequence that the people of Un hamlet reacted to the forest land allocation program by refusing to follow the way that the state allocated the land. And then the people in the hamlet came to the agreement of continuing cultivating in the previous upland fields as before.

At the same time, most people in Un hamlet refused to receive the certificate of land use rights that district rangers assigned to individual households. Of the total 14 households deeply interviewed, only two households received the certificate issued by the district authority, but they did not cultivate in the land that was assigned as in the certificate. Consequently, the reason why the households, who were deeply interviewed, did not follow the results of land allocation of the state was that: "In the past, our family had one ha of upland fields. In 1998, we were allocated 2 ha by the authority. The land assigned to us used to belong to 3 people in the village. Meanwhile, the land we formerly used was nearer our house than the land the state allocated to us. Although the area divided by the state was bigger than our old land by one hectare but it was the land of another home so I did not receive. If we followed allocation of the state, there would be arguments or conflicts between the households in the village while we are living in harmony. Because it does not meet the people's wish, it is impossible for us to follow the state's method in dividing land." (a 44 –year- old household, Son La province)

Through this way, the households in Un hamlet not only kept the land in which they previously used and cultivated but also continued to reclaiming virgin soil and expand the area in Un area and Son La province. As a result, after the allocation of forest land, the total area of upland fields of the 14 interviewed households increased in comparison with that in 1998. As it can be seen in the table, in 1998, on average each household had 1.7 hectares whereas in 2009 this number increased to 4.5 ha of upland fields, up 2.5 times. In particular, the average land area of each household using land in Son La in 1999 was only 0.7 ha per one. In 2009, each household had 2.9 ha, increasing 2.2 ha (Table 23).

**Table 23. Changes of landholding in 1998 and 2009**

ID	Year migration	Landholding 1998 (ha)			Landholding 2009 (ha)			Changed 1998/2009 (ha)		
		Total	Un	Son La	Total	Un	Son La	Total	Un	Son La
1	1993	5	1	4	6	1	5	1	0	1
2	1995	1.3	1.3	0	3.1	2.3	0.8	1.8	1	0.8
3	1995	1	1	0	4	1	3	3	0	3
4	1996	2	1	1	6	2	4	4	1	3
5	1996	1.4	0.4	1	4.4	0.4	4	3	0	3
6	1996	2.5	1	1.5	8	2	6	5.5	1	4.5
7	1998	0.5	0	0.5	2.3	0	2.3	1.8	0	1.8
8	1999	0	0	0	3	0	3	3	0	3

9	2001	0	0	0	2.1	1.5	0.6	2.1	1.5	0.6
10	1992	1	1	0	3.7	1.7	2	2.7	0.7	2
11	1995	2	2	0	5	3	2	3	1	2
12	1995	2	2	0	3.3	3.3	0	1.3	1.3	0
13	1996	1	1	0	4	2	2	3	1	2
14	1991	4	2	2	8	2	6	4	0	4
<b>Total</b>		<b>23.7</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>62.9</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>40.7</b>	<b>39.2</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>30.7</b>
<b>Average</b>		<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>2.2</b>

(Source: field survey in 2017)

At the same time, all land disputes are still resolved by the head of the family line, the leader of the religious group, basing on the rules and customs of the hamlet. The refuse of receiving land use right certificate implies that the customary power of regulation over land relations have expanded and intensified, meanwhile state regulatory powers have been diminished.

#### **b. Sedentarization program and local response**

The Project of stabilizing the life, production and socio-economic development for the Hmong people in Muong Lat district, Thanh Hoa province has been implemented since 2009 under the short name of the Project 30a. This program has been put into practice throughout the district of Muong Lat with 15 hamlets, including Un hamlet.

Officials of Protection Forest said it was the geographical location where the Hmong people live in mountainous areas, sloping and steep terrain, with most of the residential areas in forests that made the management a difficult task. Therefore, the program has been carried out with the objectives of stabilizing the local population in blend with the socio-economic development planning and synchronized investment in basic infrastructure for each village. The program aims at the goal that by 2010, the Hmong people in Un hamlet would have had permanent settlements without free migration, transforming shifting cultivation practices into other more effective economic activities, preventing replanting traditional drugs of the Hmong people, step by step overcoming poverty, contributing to retaining national defense, security, especially the border security.

Accordingly, the program has planned to rearrange the population discarding in the upstream watershed area to the lower area in order to stabilize the conveniently long term life and to benefit from investment in infrastructure construction. The new residential area is about 2-3km away from the old one. Apart from Un hamlet, the District has a total of 15 hamlets with 353 households and 2,118 people that were moved to the planned area.

In order to help the people to settle in, the district authority leveled the ground surface and arranged the living space for all 64 households in Un hamlet. The new residential area was divided into two groups of households, namely Lao Cai and Son La, with a house's floor of approximately 140m<sup>2</sup>. The location of each group's accommodation was done by self-selection. However, after leveling the floor area of the Son La group, there was only enough room for 25 households out of 40 ones. As a result, 15 households belonging to the Son La group were forced to live in the area with 24 households of Lao Cai group on the floor area prepared by the district authority by random selection of 15 households.

However, as these 15 families of Son La group used to live at the same home village and were familiar with each other, they did not agree to move to the area that the authority planned and arranged. In order to have houses for these households, other ones in the Son La group supported them by letting the old neighbors stay near their home. That the households themselves arranged the living area together ensures that the families in the blood line or neighbor relations still live together as before.

Apart from zoning the settlement area, the authority stabilized the cultivation area of the people in Un hamlet. Under this process, people only cultivated in the upland fields within the border of Un hamlet, and they were banned from slashing and burning land outside Un hamlet, especially in the watershed forest of Son La province, where many households of Un hamlet cultivated before 2009. To carry out this regulation, rangers and border guards often checked, especially in February when the villagers started to burn forests, to prevent new reclamation.

However, the implementation of fixed cultivation, limiting shifting cultivation practices in the village could not be completely prevented those practices. The households in the village continued to cultivate upland fields that they had claimed before. There was mutual assistance among the Hmong people. Whenever they heard that forest were checking, the people working in the fields in Son La would report to others to escape in order not to be caught by forest rangers. A 32-year-old interviewees in Yen Bai said: "After implementing sedentary farming, from 2011-2012, rangers start patrolling in the land in Son La. In addition to using the old upland fields that were cleared in the previous crop, my family can only expand by 0.2 hectares next to that plot of land and cannot slash and burn freely new land as before. In February or March, the time when we clear for new upland fields, forest rangers usually patrol. Whenever they come, I am informed by the Hmong people in the Son La; therefore, I know and run away. Thanks to that, I have not been caught by rangers yet and can still cultivate in upland fields in Son La"

**Table 24. Change of landholding per household between 2009 and 2017**

ID	Year migration	Landholding 2009 (ha)			Landholding 2017 (ha)			Changed 2017/2009		
		Total	Un	Son La	Total	Un	Son La	Total	Un	Son La
1	1993	6	1	5	6.0	1.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	1995	3.1	2.3	0.8	3.5	2.3	1.2	0.4	0.0	0.4
3	1995	4	1	3	6.0	1.0	5.0	2.0	0.0	2.0
4	1996	6	2	4	6.0	2.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
5	1996	4.4	0.4	4	6.4	0.4	6.0	2.0	0.0	2.0
6	1996	8	2	6	8.0	2.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
7	1998	2.3	0	2.3	3.1	0.8	2.3	0.8	0.8	0.0
8	1999	3	0	3	4.0	0.0	4.0	1.0	0.0	1.0
9	2001	2.1	1.5	0.6	3.5	2.5	1.0	1.4	1.0	0.4
10	1992	3.7	1.7	2	6.7	2.7	4	3.0	1.0	2.0
11	1995	5	3	2	6	4	2	1.0	1.0	0.0
12	1995	3.3	3.3	0	4.6	4.3	0.3	1.3	1.0	0.3
13	1996	4	2	2	5	3	2	1.0	1.0	0.0
14	1991	8	2	6	8.2	2	6.2	0.2	0.0	0.2
<b>Total</b>		<b>62.9</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>40.7</b>	<b>77.0</b>	<b>28.0</b>	<b>49.0</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>8.3</b>
<b>Average</b>		<b>4.5</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.6</b>

(Source: field survey, 2017)

According to the data of interviews, there are 6 households (42%) who continue to practice shifting cultivation on the old sloppy land in Son La which has been reclaimed and abandoned to be fertile again before the sedentarization. In addition, eight households (57%) not only used their old upland land but also extended new cultivation area. Accordingly, the average cultivation area per household increased from 4.5 hectares in 2009, before sedentarization, into 5.5 hectares in 2017.

In addition to preventing the spread of clearing forests for farming land, rangers also try to put off the replanting traditional drugs. However, the prevention is still not radical, completely successful. In order to earn more, some households continue to plant traditional medicinal plants of Hmong people in Son La area to use for medical treatment and for sale, too. Drug plants are grown in small plots of land, mingled with their cultivation fields so it is difficult for forest rangers to detect.

## **6.6. Conclusion**

The study derives how Hmong people of Un hamlet practice forms of everyday resistance to avoid the surveillance of the State. For many modern States, especially the post-colonial ones in Asia, as that in Vietnam, one of the most fundamental problem challenging their power and sovereignty is how to integrate their diverse ethnic groups with diverse culture, knowledge, social institution and mode of livelihoods in the upland into the national border and society (Hall, Hirsch and Li, 2011; Ducan, 2004; Li, 1999; Salemin, 1997). This goal was justified by a discourse, which projects ethnic peoples' livelihoods and cultural practices as primitive, traditional, backward causing their poverty, especially the swidden cultivation was often considered as unproductive and detrimental to the environment. From then on, State's development programs have made great attempts to control rights over land through many measures such as the land allocation implementation, the prohibition of the use of forest for shifting cultivation and cutting trees from sedentarization. In line with this argument, the result of this study shows that State has implemented the forest land allocation, sedentarization program as a great effort to exercise controlling people and resources under its surveillance. However, the process did not work as the expectation. The study has found that Hmong people are neither passive nor do they accept the status created by the State and more powerful people. These Hmong have employed different strategies in their everyday resistance in order to avoid the surveillance of the state, who are trying to extract their resources from creating domination upon them. Even though the sedentarization program successfully established the fixed settlements, it has failed to form the fixed farming. The Hmong people still continue expanding the encroachment of shifting cultivation outside the village's territory and tacit cultivation traditional medicine of Hmong people. By using settlement pattern to create friction of distance from the state's power, Hmong people have successfully repelled the State's surveillance. This study indicates that policies, programs of the government are not always implemented in exactly the same way. Meanwhile, the local contexts take importance role for help local people to go beyond state's surveillance.

## CHAPTER 7

### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

#### **7.1. The different local contexts have different state-making impacts and local responses**

In term of Scott's (1998) notion of legibility, statecraft exercise to make upland landscapes and livelihood legible. It aims at accelerating economic development and consolidate the control of the State. These accounts attest to the significance of the state and its policies as a key force in shaping upland livelihoods and ecosystems. Similarly, three case studies reveal that large areas of land and natural resources in Northern Central Vietnam's upland, accessed and managed by ethnic minority people, have been appropriated to serve for the government's development schemes. The case of Bo Hon village shows that forced displacement for the construction of the Binh Dien hydropower dam completely excluded ethnic traditional use of forest of Katu people, meanwhile, their resources now are being used for national interest of energy demand. Likewise, the Hmong people in Suoi Ton hamlet have largely been excluded the access and management on natural resources which are included for national interest of biodiversity conservation with the establishment of Pu Hu Nature Reserve. Likewise, the sedentarization program is considered as a process of the State in territorialising resources and people for ensuring the hegemony and power. In three case studies, there seems to be no compelling reason to argue that, aside from nationalizing resources, the government has tried to assimilate the ethnic minority's communities into the national society under the State's control.

It is worth noting that with different geographical settings of local resources, the state-making implementation has different outcomes, meanwhile there have also been different local responses. First is Bo Hon case study where geographical setting close to city center and under state power. The forced displacement for the construction of the Binh Dien hydropower dam completely impacted on traditional governance system and local livelihoods, meanwhile, the local people cannot mitigate the state intervention. After the resettlement, the community members lost their customary ownership of their lands, receiving small plots of residential land allocated under the government's ownership system. The people of Bo Hon village also lost their right to access the natural forest, which is now strictly controlled by the local authority. This is directly contrary to the village's customary governance system. Moreover, the village patriarch now plays a less important role because the commonly held property, which used to be allocated by the patriarch, no longer exists. With the new local governance system introduced by the People's Committee of the Commune, the village patriarch now competes with the village head for the influences on their people. As a representative of the Communist Party, the village head has the duties of of forming

and maintaining a connection between the government at the commune level and the villagers in the community. The government has tried to establish a new landownership system with new land-management actors, a new administrative system, and cash-crop farming practices. However, these actions have not only removed the resources needed to sustain the livelihoods of the Katu people but also denied and subjugated their customary rights and culture, to the point of eliminating local knowledge. Land acquisition in the old village and land allocation in the new resettlement area have been central to reconstructing landownership from communal to individual ownership.

Meanwhile, the second case study is Suoi Ton hamlet where geographical settings far away from city center and under state power. The establishment of Pu Hu Nature Reserve has excluded natural resources which used to be accessed and managed by Hmong people. Furthermore, the limitation of access inside the Pu Hu Nature Reserve has largely reduced and that has eliminated their ability to meet their basic subsistence needs. Most villagers have found themselves living under a great pressure of resource scarcity that impact on local livelihoods. Unlike the Bo Hon case study, the responses of the Hmong people in Suoi Ton hamlet, however, functioned as a 'risk-averter' against the state interventions. The redistribution of land intra-ethnically within Hmong communities functioned to mitigate risk, based on norms of reciprocity and subsistence. This also provided safety nets for villagers in times of resource scarcity. Furthermore, Muong and Thai peoples shared land with Hmong peoples in their resettlement. This indicated a norm of reciprocity in inter-ethnic relationships. Despite the risk of future land shortage for Thai and Muong peoples, they felt they had a moral duty to help Hmong people due to the displacement process. It indicated that the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic relationships based on the 'subsistence ethic' have helped the locals successfully mitigate the state intervention.

The third case study is Un hamlet where geographical settings more far away from city center and outside state power. The state has implemented the forest land allocation, sedentarization program as a great effort to exercise controlling people and resources that impact on local livelihoods. Correspondingly, by using everyday resistance to create friction of distance from the state power, Hmong people have successfully avoided the state intervention. The Hmong community refuses the use of land allocated by the state, expands the encroachment of shifting cultivation outside the village territory and tacit cultivation traditional medicine of Hmong people. The different outcomes of the state-making policies also come from the location between the local people and the power of the state. It argues that when the presence and control of the state are strong, the local agency has no chance to make their roles. In contrast, when the power of the state are weak or absent, the local agency has shown a strong role to overcome or avoid the State-making force. It means the results of state-making have produced a diversity of outcomes. The

State-making policies have proceeded smoothly in some areas but have not been completed in others, which mainly depend on local contexts and geographical settings.

### **7.2. Inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic relationship play important role to mitigate state intervention**

The concept of a 'Moral Economy' was introduced by Scott (1976) and emphasized that the norm of reciprocity and the norm of subsistence play an important role for peasant prevention of the risks from state intervention. All members of the community have a right to a minimum level of subsistence, and the community must support this right. They have a moral duty to help one another. They prefer to maintain 'safety first' for survival, rather than take risks to maximize their income. The local people in our study area corroborate with the previous results of Hmong studies about intra-ethnic relations through sharing the bonds of kinship and ethnicity. On the other hand, however, the evidence from this case study provides additional insights into the school of Moral Economy, arguing that inter-ethnic relations can encourage an intra-ethnic dynamic to mitigate the state intervention. This study emphasized that not only the intra-ethnic relationship but also the inter-ethnic relationship among ethnic minorities can play an important role in maintaining the Moral Economy, are expected to deepen the previous understanding on the Moral Economy, which has previously constrained its scope to the intra-ethnic relationship.

In sum up, this study implies that the current problems of ethnic people in the upland areas of North Central Vietnam are closely linked to the increasing involvement in the state-making, which has tried to exclude the right of accessing to natural resources and integrates them into the the state's control. These state-making considerably changed the traditional governance system and livelihoods of ethnic people. Meanwhile, the local contexts consist of geographical settings, inter and intra-ethnic relations that play an importance role in mitigating the state's interventions. These findings help the state reconsider the state-making that have been constructed with very little respects for differences and desires of ethnic peoples.

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ANNEXS

**HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE**

*The case of Bo Hon village, Binh Thanh commune, Huong Tra district, Thua Thien Hue Province*

**1. General information**

**Q1: Name, age, education level, job before and after resettlement**

TT	Name	Gender	Relate to hh's head	Age	Education level	Jobs before resettlement	Jobs after resettlement

**2. The compensation, resettlement processing**

**Q2. Year for resettlement:** .....

**Q3. Did you receive the announcement of resettlement?**

Yes       No

**Q4. If yes, please specify when you receive?**

.....

**Q5. Who is responsibility for the announcement?**

- a. Head of village
- b. Patriarch
- c. Government
- d. Others

**Q6. Who is related to the compensation, resettlement process? Give the details of their responsibility?**

- a. Province level: .....
- b. District level: .....
- c. Commune level: .....
- d. Village level: .....
- e. Binh Dien company: .....
- f. Others: .....

**Q7. Did you accept with the compensation, resettlement implementation?**

Yes       No

Could you explain detail:

.....  
 .....

**Q8. If not accept, who you will give the complaints?**

- a. Head of village
- b. The patriarch
- c. The neighbour/ relatives
- d. The government
- e. Binh Dien company
- f. Others

**Q9. What did you received in the compensation and support package?**

.....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....

**3. Change in livelihoods**

**3.1. Land**

No	Questions	Before resettlement	After resettlement
Q10	Land use	a. Residence: ..... b. Agricultural: ..... c. Others: .....	a. Residence: ..... b. Agricultural: ..... c. Others: .....
Q11	The land use right certificated?	a. Yes b. No	a. Yes b. No
Q12	Kind of ownership	a. Individual b. Group of households c. Community/village	a. Individual b. Group of households c. Community/village
Q13	Type of plants?	a. Wet field b. Dry field c. Cassava d. Acacia e. Bamboo f. Others: .....	a. Wet field b. Dry field c. Cassava d. Acacia e. Bamboo f. Others: .....

<b>Q14</b>	<b>How about the land cultivation after resettlement?</b>	a. Better than before resettlement b. Worse than before resettlement c. The same as before resettlement	
<b>Q15.</b>	<b>Did you use fertilize?</b>	a. Yes b. No	a. Yes b. No

### 3.2. Income

No	Questions	Before resettlement	After resettlement
<b>Q16</b>	<b>The monthly income of your households?</b>		
<b>Q17</b>	<b>Source of income (%)</b>	- Agricultural:  - Livestock:  - Non-agricultural:  - Other sources:	- Agricultural:  - Livestock:  - Non-agricultural:  - Other sources:

### 4. Change of local governance

No	Questions	Before resettlement	After resettlement
<b>Q18</b>	<b>Structure of local governance?</b>		



**6. Households opinions:**

**Q24. What are the advantage and disadvantage of your household after resettlement?**

a. Advantage:

b. Disadvantage:

## HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

*The case of Suoi Ton hamlet, Phu Son commune, Quan Hoa district, Thanh Hoa Province*

### 1. General information

- Age .....
- Sex:  Male       Female
- Ethnic group: ..... Sub-ethnic group: .....
- Household head  
 Yes       No, please specify relation to household head: .....
- Hometown: .....
- Number of family member:

### 2. Migration information

- Migration year: .....
- Reason of migration: .....

### 3. Landholding and livelihood activities before resettlement (1998)

#### 3.1. Landholding

Plot	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Acre (ha)							
Year							
Origin							
Location							
Crop							

- Landholding per household (1998): ..... ha/household
- Number of family member (1998): : ..... person
- Landholding per person (1998): .....ha/person

#### 3.2. Livelihood activities

Livelihood activities	Detail
Agricultural	
Livestock	

NTFPs	
Other activities	

#### 4. Landholding and livelihood activities after resettlement (2004)

##### 4.1. Landholding

Plot	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Acre (ha)							
Year							
Origin							
Location							
Crop							

- Landholding per household (2004): ..... ha/household

- Number of family member (2004): : ..... person

- Landholding per person (2004): .....ha/person

##### 4.2. Livelihood activities

Livelihood activities	Detail
Agricultural	
Livestock	
NTFPs	
Other activities	

#### 5. State intervention and local response

##### 5.1. State intervention

- Do your family lost land inside Pu Hu Nature Reserve?

Yes       No

- If yes, please specify:

+ Acre land: ..... (ha)

+ Number plots: ..... (plot)

## 5.2. Local response

Donors       Recipients       Others

- If you are donor:

Land area: ..... (ha)      Number of plot: .....(plot)

Receiver: ..... Relationship: .....

- If you are recipient:

Land area: ..... (ha)      Number of plot: .....(plot)

Giver: ..... Relationship: .....

<b>Plot</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
Acre (ha)							
Year							
Origin							
Location							
Crop							

- Landholding per household (2005): ..... ha/household

- Landholding per person (2005): .....ha/person

<b>Livelihood activities</b>	<b>Detail</b>
Agricultural	
Livestock	
NTFPs	
Other activities	

## HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

*The case of Un hamlet, Muong Ly commune, Muong Lat district, Thanh Hoa Province*

### 1. General information

- Age .....

- Sex:  Male       Female

- Ethnic group: ..... Sub-ethnic group:

.....

- Household head

Yes       No, please specify relation to household head:

.....

1. Hometown: .....

2. Number of family member:

### 2. Migration information

- Migration year: .....

- Reason of migration: .....

### 3. Landholding and livelihood activities in 1998

#### 3.1. Landholding

Plot	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Acre (ha)							
Year							
Origin							
Location							
Crop							

#### 3.2. Livelihood activities

Livelihood activities	Detail
Agricultural	
Livestock	

NTFPs	
Other activities	

#### 4. Landholding and livelihood activities in 2009

##### 4.1. Landholding

Plot	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Acre (ha)							
Year							
Origin							
Location							
Crop							

##### 4.2. Livelihood activities

Livelihood activities	Detail
Agricultural	
Livestock	
NTFPs	
Other activities	

## 5. Landholding and livelihood activities after sedentarization

### 5.1. Landholding

<b>Plot</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
Acre (ha)							
Year							
Origin							
Location							
Crop							

### 5.2. Livelihood activities

<b>Livelihood activities</b>	<b>Detail</b>
Agricultural	
Livestock	
NTFPs	
Other activities	