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ID 44386
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Title Alternative
Quality choice, vertical product differentiation, and labor-managed oligopoly
Author
Abstract
Although quality choice of profit-maximizing oligopolistic firms has been widely analyzed, it is rare to find such an analysis of labor-managed oligopolistic firms. This paper considers the relationship between vertical product differentiation and labor-managed firms in either partial or full market coverage by using a two-stage game model. At the second stage they are involved in either Bertrand or Cournot competition. Then some results, which are different from those derived from the conventional firms, are obtained. For example, 1) when labor-managed firms are involved in price competition in an output market, there exists an interior solution only in an extremely limited case; 2) fixed costs affect not only price and output levels but also the level of quality under both price and quantity competition; and 3) it is impossible to analyze under full market coverage, irrespective of whether labor-managed firms are involved in price or quantity competition in an output market.
Note
論説 (Article)
Published Date
2011-03-18
Publication Title
岡山大学経済学会雑誌
Publication Title Alternative
Okayama Economic Review
Volume
volume42
Issue
issue4
Publisher
岡山大学経済学会
Publisher Alternative
The Economic Association of Okayama University
Start Page
1
End Page
15
ISSN
0386-3069
NCID
AN00032897
Content Type
Journal Article
language
日本語
Copyright Holders
Copyright © 2011 岡山大学経済学会
File Version
publisher
Refereed
True
Eprints Journal Name
oer